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INTRODUCTION
In July 2020, Tesla, the world’s largest electric automotive
manufacturer, 1 sued several of its former employees and Rivian, a small
competitor, in California state court. 2 According to Tesla, Rivian
“encourage[d]” the former Tesla employees, who left the company for
Rivian, to furnish Rivian with Tesla trade secrets and/or “proprietary
information,” even though Rivian knew those individuals had signed
nondisclosure agreements (NDAs) with Tesla. 3 The former employees
allegedly misappropriated, among other things, materials related to Tesla
recruiting 4 and manufacturing, 5 as well as a list of Tesla employees with
expertise in vehicle-charging networks.6 As the litigation continues, Tesla
insists that this information, if known to Rivian, would give the company a
“huge competitive advantage.”7 Meanwhile, Rivian characterizes the suit as
1 Fred Lambert, Tesla Becomes World’s Largest EV Automaker, Surpasses China’s BYD, ELECTREK
(Dec. 6, 2019, 4:35 PM), https://electrek.co/2019/12/06/tesla-worlds-largest-ev-automaker-byd/
[https://perma.cc/Q5GK-UWD4].
2 Complaint at 1–2, Tesla, Inc. v. Pascale, No. 20CV368472 (Cal. Super. Ct. July 17, 2020).
3 Id. at 6.
4
Id. at 6–8.
5 Id. at 9.
6 Id. at 10.
7 Id. at 1. Since this Note was first drafted (in late 2020), there have been significant developments
in the Tesla litigation. The court mostly overruled the defendants’ demurrer to Tesla’s Second Amended
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an attempt to stifle competition. In particular, Rivian asserts that Tesla filed
suit just days after Rivian secured a multi-billion-dollar investment.8 Rivian
also asserts that Tesla is using litigation to deter other Tesla employees from
leaving the company: “[Tesla] crafted its complaint to achieve a second
improper purpose—namely to send a threatening message to its own
employees: don’t dare leave Tesla.”9 Additionally, Rivian cites numerous
internet articles that it argues show that Tesla’s recruiting processes are
publicly available, thus calling into question whether that information should
be legally protectable.10
Tesla’s first complaint contained three claims. It contended (1) that the
defendants contravened California’s Uniform Trade Secrets Act,11 (2) that
the former employees breached their NDAs, 12 and (3) that Rivian
intentionally interfered with those NDAs.13 How do these claims relate to
one another? Do Tesla’s NDA claims merely duplicate its trade secret claim,
or do they operate independently?
Some background information is needed to answer these questions. An
NDA, or confidentiality agreement, as its name implies, is a contractual
agreement that a party will not reveal certain information. Businesses often
require their employees to sign NDAs to protect company information. 14
Some of that information may qualify as trade secrets, which are pieces of
business information that are not widely known, that have some value or
potential value, and that the business has made a reasonable effort to keep
secret.15 But other business information that does not necessarily satisfy the
definition of a trade secret is still potentially valuable to the business that
Complaint. Order on Submitted Matters After Hearing at 29–31, Tesla, Inc. v. Pascale, No. 20CV368472
(Cal. Super. Ct. Apr. 1, 2021). Tesla has now filed its third amended complaint in the case, and the court
recently granted its contested motion to file a fourth. Third Amended Complaint, Tesla, Inc. v. Pascale,
No. 20CV368472 (Cal. Super. Ct. May 12, 2021); Order on Motion of Tesla, Inc. for Leave to File Fourth
Amended Complaint, Tesla, Inc. v. Pascale, No. 20CV368472 (Cal. Super. Ct. Sept. 28, 2021). These
changes are all noted as of October 4, 2021; further updates may have taken place since then. For purposes
of convenience, this Note will refer to Tesla’s initial complaint and Rivian’s initial demurrer throughout,
but it will note any significant updates to the litigation that have taken place since then.
8 Demurrer at 8–9, Tesla, Inc. v. Pascale, No. 20CV368472 (Cal. Super. Ct. Aug. 10, 2020).
9 Id. at 10.
10 See id. at 9 & n.2.
11 Complaint, supra note 2, at 12–14.
12 Id. at 14–15.
13 Id. at 15–16. Tesla’s third amended complaint also contains a claim for violation of the California
Computer Access Data and Fraud Act. Third Amended Complaint, supra note 7, at 22–23.
14 Carol M. Bast, At What Price Silence: Are Confidentiality Agreements Enforceable?, 25 WM.
MITCHELL L. REV. 627, 627 (1999) (“Employees routinely sign confidentiality agreements, promising
not to disclose employer confidential information.”).
15 See infra Section I.A for the most common statutory definition of a trade secret (under the Uniform
Trade Secrets Act).
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owns it. This class of information, called “confidential business information”
or “CBI” in this Note, may be protected via an NDA.16 But NDAs protecting
CBI, or “CBI NDAs,” 17 can come with negative public consequences. If
these NDAs are drafted very broadly––for example, if they cover
information that an employee would learn in the course of on-the-job
training––they may render it difficult for employees to leave their positions
and obtain similar employment elsewhere, meaning that the NDA would
essentially function as a noncompete agreement.18 Overly broad NDAs may
hinder economic competition by deterring competitors from hiring
employees away from their rivals. 19 Thus, CBI NDAs present a conflict
between competing values: on the one hand, businesses’ interests in
protecting CBI, and on the other, employees’ interests in their own mobility
and the public interest in healthy economic competition. This conflict and
others are raised in Tesla itself. Consider the following questions about the
Tesla case:
How should courts classify business information, and what types of
business information are legally protectable?
Tesla asserts that an expansive range of information, from
manufacturing information to a mere list of employees, constitutes company
trade secrets and/or CBI. 20 How do, and should, courts determine the
protectability of such information? What is a trade secret, and how is it
different from CBI? Moreover, when, if ever, does CBI cease to be
“confidential” or lose legal protectability? Or may parties protect by contract
even publicly available information?
How broadly may businesses draft CBI NDAs?
Tesla’s NDA classifies as CBI “all information, in whatever form and
format, to which [employees] have access by virtue of and in the course of
16

See infra Section I.C.
“CBI” and “CBI NDA” are not new terms; other commentators have used them. See Craig P.
Ehrlich & Leslie Garbarino, Do Secrets Stop Progress? Optimizing the Law of Non-Disclosure
Agreements to Promote Innovation, 16 N.Y.U. J.L. & BUS. 279, 279, 298 (2020).
18 See infra Section III.B. Noncompete agreements, or “noncompetes,” are “a popular contractual
tool used by employers to restrict an employee’s post-employment ability to work for a competitor or
start a competing enterprise.” Norman D. Bishara, Covenants Not to Compete in a Knowledge Economy:
Balancing Innovation from Employee Mobility Against Legal Protection for Human Capital Investment,
27 BERKELEY J. EMP. & LAB. L. 287, 294 (2006). Noncompetes are disfavored contracts in many
jurisdictions because they restrain trade and restrict employee mobility. Id. at 298 & n.42. As a result,
many jurisdictions require noncompetes to comply with limitations meant to ensure reasonableness. See
infra note 153 and accompanying text.
19 See infra note 305 and accompanying text.
20 See supra notes 4–6 and accompanying text.
17
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[their] employment by [Tesla].”21 Read literally, this provision would protect
broad swaths of knowledge a Tesla employee gains during her
employment. 22 Can, and should, businesses wield such significant power
over their employees?
When do CBI NDAs functionally become noncompete agreements?
Rivian suggests that Tesla is attempting to circumvent California’s
“strong public policy favoring employee mobility” by punishing departing
employees with NDA litigation. 23 Indeed, California law generally bans
employee noncompetes: in the state, “every contract by which anyone is
restrained from engaging in a lawful profession, trade, or business of any
kind is to that extent void.”24 Is Tesla attempting to accomplish through a
CBI NDA what it cannot legally do in California with a noncompete?
Do CBI NDAs conflict with trade secret law?
By definition, CBI is information that is not a trade secret. 25 Does
contractually protecting CBI pose a threat to the policy choices underlying
trade secret law? If so, should courts prohibit businesses from contractually
protecting information other than trade secrets?
This Note endeavors to answer these questions by advancing two
primary contributions. First, this Note systematically surveys and classifies
current judicial approaches to the enforceability of CBI NDAs. As will be
demonstrated, judicial attitudes toward such contracts vary widely: some
courts enforce the contracts entirely as written, others refuse to recognize
any category of protectable business information apart from trade secrets,
and many courts occupy a middle ground between these two extremes.
Second, this Note develops and presents a framework courts should use to
evaluate the enforceability of CBI NDAs. This framework, which is based
on the public policy defense to contractual enforcement, invites courts to
consider the extent to which enforcing a CBI NDA would protect employees’
bargaining power and economic mobility and also reflect the policy interests
underlying trade secret law.

21

Complaint, supra note 2, Ex. A, at 1.
The NDA purports to exclude from its scope “information that is or lawfully becomes part of the
public domain,” but the employee must prove that this exclusion applies by clear and convincing
evidence. Id.
23 Demurrer, supra note 8, at 10.
24 CAL. BUS. & PROF. CODE § 16600 (West 2021).
25 See Ehrlich & Garbarino, supra note 17, at 279–80 (stating that CBI is information that “is not
quite a trade secret but is not publicly known either”).
22
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The validity of CBI NDAs is of especially pressing interest nowadays.
In just the past few years, there has been a surge of scholarly interest in NDA
law. For instance, #MeToo, a movement focused on exposing instances of
sexual harassment and assault, 26 has drawn scholars’ attention to NDAs.
Some have argued that NDAs impose negative social costs when they are
used to protect sexual abusers and prevent victims from speaking out.27 And
former President Donald Trump’s use of NDAs in his personal life and
during his Administration has drawn ire from commentators who believe
such contracts should not be enforceable.28 Both of these lines of discussion,
though very different in terms of their substantive content, rest on a common
belief that the enforcement of NDAs can restrict individual freedom and
negatively impact public life. This Note investigates that belief further, in
the specific context of CBI NDAs. Like other NDAs, CBI NDAs can be
publicly harmful and hazardous to individual freedom if they stifle
innovation and employee mobility. This is especially the case in our
increasingly integrated national and global economy, in which employee
mobility is of central importance and employer–employee loyalty has been
comparatively diminished.29 In such an environment, it makes sense to ask
whether the information-protection benefits that accrue to employers as a
result of CBI NDAs can justify their potentially adverse public impacts.
Thus, this Note’s approach to NDAs is similar to those taken by other

26

See Lauren del Valle & Eric Levenson, Harvey Weinstein to Be Extradited to Los Angeles to Face
Further Sexual Assault Charges, CBS58 (June 15, 2021, 4:34 PM), https://www.cbs58.com/news/harveyweinstein-to-be-extradited-to-los-angeles-to-face-further-sexual-assault-charges [https://perma.cc/PJ2Z5LUB] (describing the #MeToo movement as “a wave of women speaking publicly about the
pervasiveness of sexual abuse and harassment”).
27 See, e.g., David A. Hoffman & Cathy Hwang, The Social Cost of Contract, 121 COLUM. L. REV.
979, 989 (2021) (“This work argues that ‘hush contracts’—nondisclosure agreements that suppress
information about sexual wrongdoing—harm society by . . . allowing society to believe it has remedied
issues of sexual harassment and abuse, insulating perpetrators from accountability, and allowing
perpetrators to continue harming new victims.”); Emily Otte, Comment, Toxic Secrecy: Non-Disclosure
Agreements and #MeToo, 69 U. KAN. L. REV. 545, 546 (2021) (questioning “whether NDAs should exist
at all,” given their potential use in concealing acts of sexual abuse); Maureen A. Weston, Buying Secrecy:
Non-Disclosure Agreements, Arbitration, and Professional Ethics in the #MeToo Era, 2021 U. ILL. L.
REV. 507, 513 (“The ability to ‘buy secrecy’ [with] NDAs . . . can result in harm and trauma to others.”).
28 See, e.g., Heidi Kitrosser, Trump’s Political NDAs Are an Abomination to the First Amendment,
SLATE (July 2, 2020), https://slate.com/news-and-politics/2020/07/mary-trump-political-ndas-firstamendment.html [https://perma.cc/RB5Z-FRZT] (arguing that President Trump’s use of NDAs on his
campaign staffers represents an attempt to “circumvent[]” the First Amendment by preventing the staffers
from criticizing him). Professor Kitrosser is “an expert on the constitutional law of federal government
secrecy and on separation of powers and free speech law more broadly.” Heidi Kitrosser, UNIV. OF MINN.
L. SCH., https://www.law.umn.edu/profiles/heidi-kitrosser [https://perma.cc/T2R4-5HL3].
29 See Michael J. Garrison & John T. Wendt, The Evolving Law of Employee Noncompete
Agreements: Recent Trends and an Alternative Policy Approach, 45 AM. BUS. L.J. 107, 166 (2008).
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contemporary commentators, but the Note applies that approach to a
comparatively less studied type of NDA (CBI NDAs).
Part I of this Note describes the three categories of business information
and the legal protection they receive from courts. Part II introduces the public
policy defense to contract enforcement and explains why this defense could
be useful in analyzing CBI NDAs. Part III examines case law surrounding
CBI NDA enforcement. Part IV examines courts’ public policy attitudes
toward NDAs outside the CBI context. Finally, Part V presents a public
policy framework for evaluating CBI NDAs’ enforceability in which courts
should examine the various interests favoring and contrary to such NDAs’
enforcement. This Note concludes that the public policy framework will help
courts balance businesses’ interests in protecting CBI with the public
interests in safeguarding employee mobility and an open, competitive
marketplace.
I.

THE WORLD OF BUSINESS INFORMATION

To understand efforts to protect business information contractually, it
is important to understand what types of business information exist. There
are three: trade secrets; CBI, sometimes referred to as “proprietary
information”; and nonconfidential information, also known as “general skills
and knowledge.”30 These types of information are entitled to varying levels
of protection. At one extreme, trade secrets are safeguarded by statute or
common law in every state.31 Conversely, courts have seen little value in
protecting general skills and knowledge. Agreements purporting to protect
such information have often been adjudged unenforceable. 32 Resting
30 See Bernier v. Merrill Air Eng’rs, 770 A.2d 97, 104 (Me. 2001) (describing CBI as “information
that does not rise to the level of a trade secret but is more than general skill or knowledge”); Orthofix,
Inc. v. Hunter, 630 F. App’x 566, 567 (6th Cir. 2015) (listing trade secrets, CBI, and “general skills and
knowledge” as the “three separate categories of business information”); Chris Montville, Note, Reforming
the Law of Proprietary Information, 56 DUKE L.J. 1159, 1159–60 (2007) (describing “proprietary
information” as “a different and far more vaguely defined category of protection” from the protection
provided by trade secret law).
31 Montville, supra note 30, at 1162.
32 See, e.g., AssuredPartners, Inc. v. Schmitt, 44 N.E.3d 463, 475 (Ill. App. Ct. 2015) (explaining
that a provision aimed at protecting “every kind of information that [the employee] learned during the
period of his employment even if non-confidential” is “an impermissible restraint of trade and . . . void
as a matter of law” (quoting N. Am. Paper Co. v. Unterberger, 526 N.E.2d 621, 624–25 (Ill. App. Ct.
1988))); Disher v. Fulgoni, 464 N.E.2d 639, 644 (Ill. App. Ct. 1984) (holding that an NDA that left the
“subject matter” of the employee’s confidentiality obligation “open-ended” could not be enforced); Serv.
Ctrs. of Chi., Inc. v. Minogue, 535 N.E.2d 1132, 1137 (Ill. App. Ct. 1989) (holding that an NDA “defining
confidential information as essentially all of the information . . . ‘concerning or in any way relating’ to
the services offered” was void); McGough v. Nalco Co., 496 F. Supp. 2d 729, 756 (N.D. W. Va. 2007)
(holding that an NDA was unenforceable because it was “written so broadly as to cover everything [the

823

NORTHWESTERN UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

uneasily between these extremes is CBI.33 Because CBI is protected in most
jurisdictions by contract alone,34 a key issue in many legal disputes over CBI
is whether those contracts are enforceable.
This Part will describe these three categories of information, beginning
with trade secrets and general skills and knowledge before turning to the
more abstruse category of CBI.
A. Trade Secrets
Trade secrets give their owners full property rights and thus also allow
their owners remedies in the case of misappropriation. 35 The history of
American trade secret law has been muddy, with only relatively recent
efforts providing some clarity and uniformity in the law.36
The most significant of these efforts was the Uniform Trade Secrets Act
(UTSA). Drafted by the National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform
State Laws in 1979 and amended in 1985,37 the UTSA has been enacted in
forty-eight states as of 2018 (plus the District of Columbia and two
territories). 38 The UTSA provides a cause of action against trade secret
misappropriation39 and defines a “trade secret” as:
information, including a formula, pattern, compilation, program, device,
method, technique, or process, that: (i) derives independent economic value,
actual or potential, from not being generally known to, and not being readily
ascertainable by proper means by, other persons who can obtain economic value
from its disclosure or use, and (ii) is the subject of efforts that are reasonable
under the circumstances to maintain its secrecy.40

employee] might have learned while working at [his employer]”); Softchoice Corp. v. MacKenzie, 636 F.
Supp. 2d 927, 939 (D. Neb. 2009) (holding that a claim for breach of an NDA failed because “the
information at issue . . . [was] not confidential and not a trade secret,” but was instead “freely available
throughout the industry”).
33 Montville, supra note 30, at 1162.
34 Id. at 1166.
35 Ehrlich & Garbarino, supra note 17, at 295.
36 Unlike patents and copyrights, which were mentioned in the Constitution and subject to federal
legislation early in American history, trade secrets “ha[ve] no constitutional provenance.” Deepa
Varadarajan, The Trade Secret-Contract Interface, 103 IOWA L. REV. 1543, 1549 (2018). Until recently,
“there [was] no federal trade secret law.” Alan J. Tracey, The Contract in the Trade Secret Ballroom—A
Forgotten Dance Partner?, 16 TEX. INTELL. PROP. L.J. 47, 54 (2007). But see Defend Trade Secrets Act,
18 U.S.C. § 1836(b)(1) (2016) (providing a federal cause of action against trade secret misappropriation).
37 Tracey, supra note 36, at 57.
38 Understanding the Uniform Trade Secrets Act, FREIBERGER HABER LLP (Apr. 4, 2018),
https://fhnylaw.com/understanding-uniform-trade-secrets-act/ [https://perma.cc/V79C-YBLJ].
39 See UNIF. TRADE SECRETS ACT §§ 2(a), 3(a) (NAT’L CONF. COMM’RS ON UNIF. STATE L. 1985)
(“Actual or threatened misappropriation [of trade secrets] may be enjoined.”).
40 Id. § 1(4).
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This definition contains “three specific and mandatory requirements”:
secrecy, economic value, and reasonable efforts to maintain secrecy.41 Most
important is secrecy, a “uniformly critical” predicate to legal protection.42 In
other words, the UTSA focuses primarily on the nature of the information to
be protected, including its secrecy—the existence of an actual trade secret.
The UTSA also preempts other civil remedies for trade secret
misappropriation. 43 Most courts to address the issue have held that this
preemption provision displaces common law actions to protect CBI.44 But
the UTSA does not preempt “contractual remedies, whether or not based
upon misappropriation of a trade secret.”45 As such, contractual actions are
the sole basis for protecting CBI in many jurisdictions.46
B. Nonconfidential Information (General Skills and Knowledge)
There is no similar protection for nonconfidential information or
“general skills and knowledge.” Indeed, this class of information often
cannot even be protected by contract. 47 General skills and knowledge is
information known to most every participant in an industry.48 For example,
most journalists probably know how to write headlines and conduct
interviews. Such information is not legally protectable because protecting it
would “unnecessarily restrict employees’ mobility” and “unduly hamper
legitimate competition.”49 This is true because protecting general knowledge
an employee gains from her job would effectively prevent the employee from
working the same job again. In the journalism example, a journalist who
41 Sharon K. Sandeen, The Evolution of Trade Secret Law and Why Courts Commit Error When They
Do Not Follow the Uniform Trade Secrets Act, 33 HAMLINE L. REV. 493, 521 (2010). The UTSA also
represents a modern “refocusing of trade secret law” from its earlier history. Sharon K. Sandeen, A
Contract by Any Other Name Is Still a Contract: Examining the Effectiveness of Trade Secret Clauses to
Protect Databases, 45 IDEA 119, 130 (2005) [hereinafter Sandeen, A Contract by Any Other Name].
Many early trade secret cases “focus[ed] more on the relationship between the parties than the existence
of a trade secret.” Id. at 128. By contrast, the UTSA fixes courts’ “attention on the character of the
[information] to be protected.” Id. at 129.
42 Montville, supra note 30, at 1163.
43 UNIF. TRADE SECRETS ACT § 7(a).
44 Atl. Med. Specialists, LLC v. Gastroenterology Assocs., P.A., No. CV N15C-06-245 CEB,
2017 WL 1842899, at *14 (Del. Super. Ct. Apr. 20, 2017) (“The ‘majority view’ of [UTSA] section 7
displacement holds that non-trade secret information is not a protectable class of information and
therefore common law claims that seek to protect it are preempted.”).
45 UNIF. TRADE SECRETS ACT § 7(b)(1).
46 See Montville, supra note 30, at 1166.
47 See supra note 32 and accompanying text.
48 See Robert Unikel, Bridging the “Trade Secret” Gap: Protecting “Confidential Information” Not
Rising to the Level of Trade Secrets, 29 LOY. U. CHI. L.J. 841, 844, 889 (1998) (describing a class of
“Category 1” information that is analogous to general skills and knowledge).
49 Id. at 850–51.
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could not use her knowledge about conducting interviews would be
practically barred from working as a journalist.50 Accordingly, as a general
matter, the only way general skills or knowledge can be protected is with an
enforceable noncompete. 51 In other words, courts often presume that
employees can freely use general skills and knowledge when they leave an
employer,52 because holding otherwise would have anticompetitive effects.
C. CBI
CBI is less well defined than the previous categories. Most jurisdictions
recognize CBI “implicitly . . . without acknowledging it as specifically
protectable.”53 CBI is frequently identified by what it is not, rather than what
it is. For instance, Professors Craig Ehrlich and Leslie Garbarino describe
CBI as “that which is not quite a trade secret but is not publicly known
either.”54 Similarly, one court outlines CBI when describing “information
that does not rise to the level of a trade secret but is more than general skill
or knowledge.” 55 These comments provide two fundamental insights
regarding CBI: (1) CBI is not a trade secret, meaning that CBI fails to meet

50 See McGough v. Nalco Co., 496 F. Supp. 2d 729, 756 (N.D. W. Va. 2007) (“The [NDA] provisions
are written so broadly as to cover everything [the employee] might have learned while working [for his
employer], [so] if he were to strictly abide by its terms, he would be unable to ever work in a similar field
again.”).
51 RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF UNFAIR COMPETITION § 42 cmt. d (AM. L. INST. 1995). Note, however,
that some courts permit NDAs to protect such nonconfidential information. See infra Section III.A.1.
52 See, e.g., Samuel Bingham Co. v. Maron, 651 F. Supp. 102, 106 (N.D. Ill. 1986) (“A terminated
employee is free to use general skills and knowledge acquired during employment.”); Boost Co. v.
Faunce, 86 A.2d 283, 286 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1952) (“It is a well settled rule of law that an
employee, upon terminating his employment, may carry away and use the general skill or knowledge
acquired during the course of the employment.”); Jet Spray Cooler, Inc. v. Crampton, 282 N.E.2d 921,
924 (Mass. 1972) (“[A]n employee may carry away and use general skill or knowledge acquired during
the course of his employment . . . .” (quoting New England Overall Co. v. Woltmann, 176 N.E.2d 193,
198 (Mass. 1961))).
53 Montville, supra note 30, at 1166. But see FLA. STAT. § 542.335(1)(b)(2) (2021) (specifying that
CBI is protectable in Florida).
54 Ehrlich & Garbarino, supra note 17, at 279–80; see also Structural Dynamics Rsch. Corp. v. Eng’g
Mechs. Rsch. Corp., 401 F. Supp. 1102, 1113 (E.D. Mich. 1975) (finding that limiting the application of
NDAs to trade secrets is “too restrictive, especially in . . . area[s] of knowledge and rapid technological
change”).
55 Bernier v. Merrill Air Eng’rs, 770 A.2d 97, 104 (Me. 2001); see also Orthofix, Inc. v. Hunter,
630 F. App’x 566, 567–68 (6th Cir. 2015) (finding that NDAs can protect more information than trade
secrets but that general skills and knowledge are not the proper subject of an NDA); Am. Software USA,
Inc. v. Moore, 448 S.E.2d 206, 209 (Ga. 1994) (holding that NDA properly restricted disclosure of “trade
secrets” and “confidential business information” that was not publicly available); Unikel, supra note 48,
at 889 (arguing that “valuable business information” should be classified as “trade secrets,” “confidential
information,” or “general skill and knowledge”).
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one or more of the UTSA’s requirements, 56 and (2) CBI is not publicly
available. Still, the relative scarcity of insight regarding what information
constitutes CBI raises thorny issues when business entities attempt to protect
CBI contractually.57
Courts frequently conceive of CBI NDAs as expanding businesses’
legal protection beyond that provided by trade secret law.58 But the extent to
which business entities may use NDAs to enhance the legal protectability of
their information is unclear.59 One reason for this uncertainty is that authority
is divided regarding the proper relationship between CBI law and trade secret
law. Should trade secret law inform courts’ approach when determining
CBI’s protectability, or should the two classes of information be subject to
different criteria? The Sixth Circuit has taken up the former position,
asserting that “the rules governing trade secrets are . . . relevant in analyzing
the reasonableness and enforceability of [NDAs] because, in order to justify
the contractual restraint, information subject to [NDAs] must share at least
some characteristics with information protected by trade secret statutes.”60 A
few courts have gone further, asserting that non-trade-secret information
should receive no legal protection under an NDA.61 Other courts, however,
view CBI as independent from trade secrets and thus not subject to the
limitations of trade secret law. 62 Still other courts avoid imposing the
56 See supra notes 40–41 and accompanying text (noting the three UTSA requirements of secrecy,
economic value, and reasonable efforts to maintain secrecy).
57
Further complicating attempts to conceptualize CBI is the fact that some types of information that
are capable of attaining trade secret status, such as “client and customer lists, pricing information, . . .
strategies[,] . . . information regarding vendors, suppliers, manufacturing or purchasing, . . . plans,
formulae, [and] R&D methods and practices,” may also qualify as mere CBI if they do not meet the
UTSA’s definition. Ehrlich & Garbarino, supra note 17, at 296. In other words, in a particular case, if a
customer list does not qualify for trade secret protection, it may still be protectable as CBI. However,
some classes of business information appear ubiquitous in CBI cases, including “customer lists and
information about customers” and “business knowledge” such as “knowledge of cost information and
pricing formulas.” See Montville, supra note 30, at 1170–71.
58 See, e.g., Orthofix, 630 F. App’x at 567–68 (“‘[A] nondisclosure agreement prohibiting the use or
disclosure of particular information can clarify and extend the scope of an employer’s rights’ beyond the
protection afforded by trade secret statutes.” (quoting RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF UNFAIR COMPETITION
§ 42 cmt. g (AM. L. INST. 1995))); Empower Energies, Inc. v. SolarBlue, LLC, No. 16CV3220, 2016 WL
5338555, at *10 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 23, 2016) (“Information entitled to protection, however, may be broader
than trade secrets.”).
59 Ehrlich & Garbarino, supra note 17, at 297.
60 Orthofix, 630 F. App’x at 568 (citing RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF UNFAIR COMPETITION § 41 cmt.
d).
61 See infra Section III.A.2.
62 For instance, in Roboserve, Ltd. v. Tom’s Foods, Inc., the Eleventh Circuit stated that “[a]
confidential relationship is distinguished by the expectations of the parties involved, while a trade secret
is identified through rigorous examination of the information sought to be protected.” 940 F.2d 1441,
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requirements of trade secret law on CBI by enforcing NDAs largely as
written, with little concern for the secrecy or value of the information
protected.63
This Part has described the three categories of business information and
summarized how courts assess legal efforts to protect them. The next Part,
centered on the public policy defense, will examine a particular doctrine of
nonenforcement that applies to contract law generally.
II. THE PUBLIC POLICY DEFENSE TO CONTRACT ENFORCEMENT
This Part will summarize the public policy defense to contract
enforcement and argue that it provides a useful framework for courts to use
in CBI NDA cases.
Contract law provides individuals with broad freedom to strike legally
enforceable private bargains.64 Despite this general principle, some contracts
will not be enforced if they are contrary to public policy. The concept of
public policy balances individual freedom with “public order, public
security, public health, [and] public interest.”65 In other words, public policy
becomes relevant to contract law when the rights of the few contracting
parties would injure the rights of the many because the contract harms public
values.66 The clearest example of such a contract is one that is expressly
outlawed; 67 for example, California has broadly prohibited employee
noncompete agreements.68 But even contracts not proscribed by statute are
susceptible to a public policy defense.69 Lord Hardwicke, writing in 1750,
1456 (11th Cir. 1991) (citation omitted). While the court made this statement with respect to a confidential
business relationship rather than an NDA, id., the court’s analysis certainly suggests that CBI entails
different policy considerations from those underlying trade secret law.
63 See infra Section III.A.1 (describing the “Enforcement-as-Written” approach).
64 Alan E. Garfield, Promises of Silence: Contract Law and Freedom of Speech, 83 CORNELL L.
REV. 261, 264 (1998); see also Bd. of Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 572 (1972) (holding that the
Fourteenth Amendment guarantees “not merely freedom from bodily restraint but also the right of the
individual to contract,” among other things).
65 Farshad Ghodoosi, The Concept of Public Policy in Law: Revisiting the Role of the Public Policy
Doctrine in the Enforcement of Private Legal Arrangements, 94 NEB. L. REV. 685, 686 (2016).
66 Myanna Dellinger, Trophy Hunting Contracts: Unenforceable for Reasons of Public Policy,
41 COLUM. J. ENV’T L. 395, 427 (2016).
67 See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 178(1) (AM. L. INST. 1981) (“A promise or other
term of an agreement is unenforceable on grounds of public policy if legislation provides that it is
unenforceable . . . .”).
68 CAL. BUS. & PROF. CODE § 16600 (West 2020). See supra note 18 for the definition of a
noncompete agreement.
69 See Dellinger, supra note 66, at 424 (“Courts are not prohibited from deciding whether a contract
is . . . against public policy simply because there is not a statute that specifically limits contract terms . . . .
[Such a ruling] is an inherent equitable power of the court and does not require prior legislative action.”
(quoting State ex rel. King v. B & B Inv. Grp., Inc., 329 P.3d 658, 670 (N.M. 2014))).
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described the doctrine of public policy as follows: if a contract is a “‘general
mischief’ to the public,” it may be unenforceable on grounds of public
policy.70
The public policy defense has been criticized for its alleged uncertainty
and lack of clear analytical criteria. One famous commentary referred to
public policy as an “unruly horse”: “when you get astride of it, you never
know where it will carry you.”71 Indeed, attempts to reduce public policy to
a precise legal formula have been unsuccessful. The formulation of public
policy in the Second Restatement of Contracts weighs various factors for and
against the enforcement of a contract and holds a contract unenforceable if
“the interest in its enforcement is clearly outweighed . . . by a public policy
against [its] enforcement.” 72 But the Restatement’s impact on judicial
decisions appears minimal. A study of the public policy defense found that
only one opinion in a sample of 104 cited the Restatement’s formulation, and
only four engaged in any of the “balancing or weighing” the Restatement
calls for. 73
As Professor Farshad Ghodoosi has noted, public policy’s unruly nature
is attributable to its “depart[ure] from the structure of legal reasoning.”74 The
defense is not primarily concerned with the “internal” fairness of a bargain
between the parties: it instead examines the impact the bargain would have
on society as a whole.75 In this way, public policy is distinct from the related
doctrine of unconscionability, which is concerned with the internal fairness
of a contract and its impact on the contracting parties.76 Public policy, by

70 Ghodoosi, supra note 65, at 692 (quoting W.S.W. Knight, Public Policy in English Law, 38 LAW
Q. REV. 207, 209 (1922)).
71 Id. at 693 (quoting Richardson v. Mellish (1824) 130 Eng. Rep. 294, 303 (K.B.)).
72 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 178(1). Interests favoring enforcement include
“(a) the parties’ justified expectations, (b) any forfeiture that would result if enforcement were denied,
and (c) any special public interest in the enforcement of the particular term.” On the other hand, interests
against enforcement include

(a) the strength of [a] policy [against enforcement] as manifested by legislation or judicial
decisions, (b) the likelihood that a refusal to enforce the term will further that policy, (c) the
seriousness of any misconduct involved and the extent to which it was deliberate, and (d) the
directness of the connection between that misconduct and the term.
Id. § 178(2)–(3).
73 David Adam Friedman, Bringing Order to Contracts Against Public Policy, 39 FLA. ST. U. L.
REV. 563, 614 (2012).
74 Ghodoosi, supra note 65, at 695.
75 See id. at 697 (distinguishing public policy from unconscionability on this basis).
76 Id.
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contrast, invites judges to weigh political and moral factors not intrinsic to
the contract itself.77
The public policy defense provides an appropriate framework for
evaluating the enforceability of CBI NDAs. Take Tesla as an example.
Tesla’s effort to enforce its CBI NDA portends numerous outcomes
potentially against public policy. For instance, Tesla’s litigation may cause
other Tesla employees to fear a lawsuit if they attempt to leave the
company.78 In addition, Tesla’s use of the CBI NDA to sue a competitor
(Rivian) may inhibit competition and deter smaller firms from hiring larger
competitors’ employees. CBI NDAs, such as those at issue in Tesla, should
be subject to public policy scrutiny to ensure that public interests in
employee mobility and economic competition are protected. The next Part
begins a survey of existing case law to examine how CBI NDA
enforceability is currently assessed in practice.

77 See id. (explaining that, under the public policy defense, “[e]ven if all four corners of [a contract]
complied with provisions of jurisprudence of contract law, an external moral or legislative concern could
render it unenforceable”); see also id. at 692 (quoting Lord Hardwicke’s view that “political arguments”
are relevant to determining contracts’ enforceability). As discussed above, unconscionability is related
to, but distinct from, public policy. In order to establish unconscionability, a party must show (1) that the
contract’s “bargaining process” was “adhesive or unduly one-sided” (procedural unconscionability) and
(2) that the contract itself is “unduly oppressive or otherwise unfair” (substantive unconscionability).
Amy J. Schmitz, Embracing Unconscionability’s Safety Net Function, 58 ALA. L. REV. 73, 75 (2006).
Courts’ “increasingly rigid” use “of a two-prong unconscionability test” has, according to Professor Amy
Schmitz, impaired unconscionability’s ability to serve “as a ‘safety net’ for flexibly protecting societal
values and norms of morality, fairness, and equality that cannot be intellectualized” in contract law. Id.
Therefore, public policy, which has resisted formal classification to a fault, may be better positioned than
unconscionability to ensure that social values remain part of contract law. However, courts seem to have
implemented some rules to tame the unruly horse of public policy. Courts are more likely to credit public
policy defenses that are based on existing statutes or regulations, while general appeals to the doctrine
are less likely to succeed. See Friedman, supra note Error! Bookmark not defined., at 566.
Modern public policy may be illustrated by State ex rel. King v. B & B Investment Group, Inc., 329 P.
3d 658 (N.M. 2014). This case involved “signature loans,” which are “loans of $50 to $300 in principal”
that carry APRs of over 1000%. Id. at 663. The court found that these loans were against public policy,
noting that, even if no statute directly outlawed the terms of the loans, the terms might still be against
public policy. Id. at 670. The loans’ providers argued that the New Mexico Legislature’s removal of the
state’s cap on interest rates in 1981 showed that New Mexico had no public policy against usurious
interest rates. Id. at 672. The court rejected this argument and concluded that a series of other statutes
stood for New Mexico’s policies of small-loan regulation and consumer protection. See id. at 672–74.
King shows that, while public policy technically leaves courts free to introduce extralegal factors into
their decision-making, in practice judges will often find the most reliable sources of public policy to be
written statutes, regulations, and related materials.
78 See supra note 9 and accompanying text.
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III. THE ENFORCEABILITY OF CBI NDAS AND PUBLIC POLICY
This Part will survey the landscape of CBI NDA case law, building on
Chris Montville’s note in the Duke Law Journal. 79 Montville asked two
questions in classifying CBI case law: “what types of information do courts
protect” and “when do they protect it”? 80 To answer these questions,
Montville examined how courts protect CBI in noncompete cases (and then
examined how courts apply noncompete law—if at all—to NDAs).81 The
following is a brief summary of Montville’s categorization of these cases.
In Montville’s view, courts taking the “Categorical Enforcement”
approach to noncompetes focus primarily on “whether the former employee
might cause economic damage to his former employer,” while the “nature of
the alleged proprietary information” to be protected by the noncompete
occupies “a secondary role.” 82 By contrast, courts using the “Specificity
Approach” impose substantive requirements to determine what categories of
CBI deserve protection; for instance, these courts may oblige employers to
specifically identify the CBI to be protected by a noncompete.83 Montville
then identified three ways in which courts conceive of the relationship
between NDAs and noncompetes: some courts treat NDAs and noncompetes
identically, others impose some limitations on NDAs but do not strictly apply
the law of noncompetes to NDAs, and others hold that NDAs and
noncompetes are different sorts of contracts entirely.84
This Part builds on and adds nuance to Montville’s categorizations.
Section III.A addresses which types of information CBI NDAs are permitted
to protect, and Section III.B assesses judicial approaches to the relationship
between CBI NDAs and noncompetes. These courts, while not frequently
doing so explicitly, are essentially applying a public policy rubric to the
enforceability of CBI NDAs. These cases present a conflict between, on the
one hand, public interests such as employee well-being and “the flow of
information necessary for competition among businesses” and, on the other
hand, the “proprietary interests of the employer.” 85 Courts differ
substantially when deciding which of these interests to protect, and to what
extent, in CBI NDA cases. While this Part will compare the merits and
drawbacks of varying approaches taken by courts, it does not purport to
79 See generally Montville, supra note 30, at 1179–87 (providing a survey of courts’ evaluations of
“proprietary information under nondisclosure agreements”).
80
Id. at 1169.
81 Id. at 1173–87.
82 Id. at 1173.
83 Id. at 1177–79.
84 Id. at 1180–83.
85 Disher v. Fulgoni, 464 N.E.2d 639, 643 (Ill. App. Ct. 1984).
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present a comprehensive public policy standard for courts to apply; that is
left to the final Part of this Note.
A. Substantive Enforceability: What Information May a CBI
NDA Protect?
This Note’s analysis begins with Montville’s first question: “what types
of information do courts protect”? 86 Montville primarily examined NDA
cases indirectly, first examining how courts treat CBI in noncompete cases
and then examining how courts treat NDAs relative to noncompetes.87 This
Note will attempt to examine CBI NDA enforcement cases more directly,
while acknowledging that noncompete litigation is more common than NDA
litigation.88 Courts approach CBI NDAs’ Substantive Enforceability in many
ways: they may (1) enforce CBI NDAs as written, without considering the
nature of the information to be protected (“Enforcement-as-Written”); 89
(2) refuse to recognize CBI as protectable (“Coextensivity”);90 (3) provide
some minor substantive requirements to ensure that information under a CBI
NDA is not publicly available (“Light-Touch Reasonableness”); or
(4) require a more substantial showing that information covered by a CBI
NDA is worthy of protection, often borrowing elements from trade secret
law (“Close-Look Reasonableness”).91
1. Enforcement-as-Written
Courts applying the Enforcement-as-Written approach will protect any
information defined as CBI in an NDA, even if the information is not actually
confidential or valuable. The cases in this Section, also analyzed by
Professors Ehrlich and Garbarino, “illustrate the costs of enforcing an NDA
when the information is not confidential.”92 The Eighth Circuit endorsed the
Enforcement-as-Written approach in Loftness Specialized Farm Equipment,
Inc. v. Twiestmeyer.93 In that case, the court encountered an NDA defining
86

Montville, supra note 30, at 1169.
Id. at 1173–87.
88 McGough v. Nalco Co., 496 F. Supp. 2d 729, 744 (N.D. W. Va. 2007) (“[C]ases discussing the
validity of non-disclosure or confidentiality provisions are far fewer in number [than cases assessing the
validity of noncompetes].”).
89 This approach is analogous to Montville’s “Categorical Enforcement” category, under which
courts will deemphasize “[t]he exact nature of the alleged proprietary information” to be protected.
Montville, supra note 30, at 1173.
90 Montville, too, identified some courts that “refus[e] to recognize proprietary information” in
specific circumstances. Id. at 1183.
91 This category shares some features with the “Specificity Approach” identified by Montville. See
id. at 1177.
92 Ehrlich & Garbarino, supra note 17, at 299.
93 742 F.3d 845, 850–51 (8th Cir. 2014).
87
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“Confidential Information” as “[s]uch information that [the plaintiffs]
consider[] to be proprietary and/or confidential.”94 The court held that the
plain language of the CBI NDA included the information the plaintiffs
wished to protect and made no inquiry as to whether that information was
actually secret or had any value; indeed, the court never even challenged the
district court’s holding that the plaintiffs had “made no effort to keep their
ideas and information confidential.”95
Under the Enforcement-as-Written approach, as demonstrated by
Loftness, courts’ only consideration is the CBI NDA itself. “Confidential”
information becomes whatever the contract says it is, even if the information
protected is publicly available. 96 Courts applying this test justify it by
reference to a need to protect contractual relationships. One court, for
instance, stated that courts can legitimately protect publicly available
information contractually because such information is confidential “between
the parties.”97 The Enforcement-as-Written rule is thus in tension with trade
secret law. While secrecy is the hallmark of business information’s identity
as a trade secret, secrecy is entirely irrelevant to Enforcement-as-Written
courts when examining a CBI NDA.
The Enforcement-as-Written approach is used to enforce nominal
“NDAs” that are, in substance, noncompetes. For example, in ChemiMetals
Processing, Inc. v. McEneny, a chemicals distributor and a manufacturer
formed a distribution agreement prohibiting the distributor from producing
the manufacturer’s products. 98 The distributor argued that the agreement
restrained trade and was therefore unenforceable. 99 The court disagreed,
holding instead that the agreement designated the manufacturer’s product
line as confidential information and, therefore, that the agreement’s purpose
was not to stifle competition but to protect CBI. 100 Despite the court’s
reasoning, however, the agreement was essentially a noncompete because it
prevented a company from manufacturing products without evidence that the
methods of manufacture were confidential.101
94

Id. at 848.
Id. at 850–51.
96 Ehrlich & Garbarino, supra note 17, at 301 (discussing Loftness).
97 Platinum Mgmt., Inc. v. Dahms, 666 A.2d 1028, 1038 (N.J. Super. Ct. Law Div. 1995) (“The fact
that such information may be available from public sources does not mean that the information is not
confidential as between the parties.”).
98
476 S.E.2d 374, 375 (N.C. Ct. App. 1996); Ehrlich & Garbarino, supra note 17, at 300.
99 ChemiMetals, 476 S.E.2d at 376.
100 Id. at 376–77.
101 Ehrlich & Garbarino, supra note 17, at 300 (discussing ChemiMetals). The ChemiMetals court
vaguely mentions, without elaboration, that the products’ method of manufacture was “confidential to
95
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Some arguments favor the Enforcement-as-Written approach. Chief
among them is efficiency: Enforcement-as-Written is “a simple rule, easy to
follow, and relatively inexpensive to enforce.”102 In addition, Enforcementas-Written is most faithful to the idea that parties ought to be able to order
their private affairs through contract as they see fit.103 These considerations,
however, cannot compensate for the rule’s deficiencies. To begin, the
freedom-of-contract justification is less credible in the context of employee
NDAs, which are often broadly drafted and so common in many industries
as to be a practical prerequisite to employment.104 In such cases, employees
are often accepting take-it-or-leave-it deals rather than contracting with their
employers freely. 105 Moreover, Enforcement-as-Written’s focus on
contractual relationships ignores public interests against enforcement of
overbroad CBI NDAs. Contract law, through the public policy defense,
recognizes that some contracts are so publicly harmful they should not be
enforced.106 Protecting publicly available information because a CBI NDA
defines it as confidential could have negative public impacts. For instance,
safeguarding such information may “imped[e] cumulative innovation” if it
prevents a contracting party from using information others are free to
access.107 Enforcing overly broad CBI NDAs also impedes competition, as
shown in ChemiMetals. In that case, the court utilized a formal distinction
between NDAs and noncompetes to prohibit a company from manufacturing
the same products as its competitor.108 This absurd result, if adopted widely,
would allow businesses to avoid judicial reluctance to enforce

[the plaintiff].” 476 S.E.2d at 377. It is not clear what the court means by this, and the opinion does not
expressly state “that the formulae were not generally known in the industry.” Ehrlich & Garbarino, supra
note 17, at 300. This Note will follow Professors Ehrlich and Garbarino in their interpretation of
ChemiMetals, see id.; if the information protected in that case were actually secret, it seems the court
would have said so more clearly.
102 Ehrlich & Garbarino, supra note 17, at 302.
103 See supra note 64 and accompanying text.
104 See Montville, supra note 30, at 1188; see also Sharon Florentine, NDAs Stifling Tech Workers’
Voices, CIO (Sept. 7, 2018, 2:30 AM), https://www.cio.com/article/3304297/ndas-stifling-tech-workersvoices.html [https://perma.cc/5RFT-XGWZ] (noting the ubiquity of NDAs in the technology industry);
Orly Lobel, NDAs Are Out of Control. Here’s What Needs to Change, HARV. BUS. REV. (Jan. 30, 2018),
https://hbr.org/2018/01/ndas-are-out-of-control-heres-what-needs-to-change
[https://perma.cc/2JLDHBF6] (“New data shows that over one-third of the U.S. workforce is bound by an NDA.”).
105 See infra note 241 and accompanying text.
106 See supra Part II.
107 See Ehrlich & Garbarino, supra note 17, at 302. For instance, suppose Tesla interpreted its NDA
so as to prevent employees from using information about electric vehicle charging networks. If charging
network experts left Tesla, they would effectively be barred from working in the charging-networks field
again, thus reducing the total number of potential innovators in the field.
108 See supra notes 98–101 and accompanying text (discussing ChemiMetals).
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noncompetes109 by dressing up anticompetitive provisions as informationprotection measures. In sum, the Enforcement-as-Written approach is
deficient because courts should typically require NDA plaintiffs to show, at
a minimum, that the information they seek to protect is “confidential in
fact.” 110 Enforcement-as-Written, which fails to require this threshold
showing, is not an optimal judicial approach to NDA enforcement.
2. Coextensivity
In contrast to Enforcement-as-Written courts, other courts will not
enforce CBI NDAs to the extent they protect anything but trade secrets.111
This rule is referred to here as the Coextensivity rule because it argues that
trade secrets and CBI are “coextensive.” 112 Put differently, Coextensivity
courts do not believe that CBI exists independently of trade secrets at all.113
One notable articulation of the Coextensivity approach came in
Dynamics Research Corp. v. Analytic Sciences Corp.114 In that case, the court
held that “a[n] [NDA] which seeks to restrict the employee’s right to use an
alleged trade secret which is not such in fact or in law is unenforceable as
against public policy.”115 The court further insisted that the NDA in the case
“c[ould] only affirm the intent of the parties to be bound” by trade secret
law.116 Other courts have found that “trade secrets and [CBI] ‘are essentially
identical concepts.’” 117 Coextensivity is thus the opposite of the
Enforcement-as-Written approach. Courts adhering to the latter examine
only the CBI NDA’s language, while courts applying the former ignore the
CBI NDA and ask only if the information to be protected meets trade secret
requirements.
Courts using the Coextensivity rule have raised several arguments in its
favor. The Dynamics Research court argued that protecting information
other than trade secrets runs a risk that a CBI NDA could have
anticompetitive effects. 118 Another court, while not strictly applying a
Coextensivity rationale, provided ammunition for the rationale when it used
the UTSA’s definition of a trade secret to argue that CBI that does not meet
109

See supra note 18.
Ehrlich & Garbarino, supra note 17, at 302.
111 See Montville, supra note 30, at 1183.
112 Id. at 1184.
113 Id.
114 400 N.E.2d 1274, 1288 (Mass. App. Ct. 1980).
115 Id.
116 Id.
117 Take it Away, Inc. v. Home Depot, Inc., No. 05–12484–DPW, 2009 WL 458552, at *8 (D. Mass.
Feb. 6, 2009) (quoting United Rug Auctioneers, Inc. v. Arsalen, No. CA03-0347, 2003 WL 21527545, at
*6 (Mass. Super. Ct. Apr. 11, 2003)).
118 See Dynamics Rsch., 400 N.E.2d at 1288 n.32.
110
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the UTSA definition is “either worthless, generally known or readily
ascertainable, or not the subject of reasonable secrecy efforts.”119 While just
as extreme as Enforcement-as-Written, Coextensivity is arguably more
justifiable. The rule is more sensitive to the public hazards inherent in
sweeping CBI NDAs. Additionally, the same efficiency argument justifying
the Enforcement-as-Written rule applies with at least equal force to the
Coextensivity rule, since, like a contract, the elements of a trade secret are
clearly defined. Eliminating CBI as a protectable category of information
would clarify CBI NDA law, particularly since CBI is such a hazy and poorly
defined categorization to begin with.120
However, the Coextensivity rule is not without its flaws. The chief ill
of this approach is the burden it places on the freedom-of-contract principle.
While Enforcement-as-Written prioritizes freedom of contract over
countervailing public policy considerations, Coextensivity swings too far in
the opposite direction. The Coextensivity rule’s insistence that there can be
no protectable business information other than trade secrets can thwart
contrary contractual language, and thus significantly alter private bargains,
in some cases. Consider the Dynamics Research court’s argument that the
NDA “c[ould] only affirm the intent of the parties to be bound by the
common law of trade secrets.”121 As a matter of contractual interpretation,
this statement is clearly wrong: The NDA in Dynamics Research expressly
applied to “any trade secrets or confidential information.”122 To conclude
that this agreement only evinced the parties’ intent to be bound by trade
secret law is to ignore what the CBI NDA actually says. Had the parties
intended only to be bound by trade secret law, the reference to “confidential
information” would be superfluous. The court’s holding thus effectively
rewrites the NDA.
Additionally, for all the emphasis Coextensivity courts place on trade
secret law, the Coextensivity rule is in tension with the UTSA, which “does
not affect . . . contractual remedies, whether or not based upon
misappropriation of a trade secret.”123 This provision indicates that the UTSA
did not intend to remove parties’ ability to protect business information
contractually, even if the information at issue is a non-trade-secret. In
disallowing contractual actions based on misappropriation of CBI,
Coextensivity courts ignore the UTSA’s intention that such actions be
119 IDX Sys. Corp. v. Epic Sys. Corp., 165 F. Supp. 2d 812, 820 (W.D. Wis. 2001), overruled in part
by IDX Sys. Corp. v. Epic Sys. Corp., 285 F.3d 581, 585 (7th Cir. 2002).
120 See supra Section I.C.
121 400 N.E.2d at 1288.
122 Id. at 1287 n.31 (emphasis added).
123 UNIF. TRADE SECRETS ACT § 7(b)(1) (NAT’L CONF. COMM’RS ON UNIF. STATE L. 1985).
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preserved. Although Massachusetts had not adopted the UTSA at the time
Dynamics Research was decided, courts in UTSA jurisdictions have likewise
occasionally applied the Coextensivity rule, despite its apparent conflict with
the UTSA.124
Finally, the argument that information not meeting the definition of a
trade secret is by definition unworthy of protection is ultimately
unpersuasive. As one court has said, “us[ing] the doctrine of trade secrets in
the decisional process” for NDA cases is “too restrictive, especially in . . .
area[s] of knowledge and rapid technological change.”125 It is unlikely that
all valuable business information would qualify as a trade secret from the
moment of its discovery. For example, depending on a jurisdiction’s
interpretation of the UTSA, a business may have difficulty establishing a
brand-new idea’s “actual or potential” value, as required by the UTSA’s
trade secret definition.126 A contractual category of CBI gives businesses a
means to protect information that may not meet the rigors of the UTSA’s
definition but is still worth protecting. Finding CBI totally unprotectable may
frustrate businesses’ ability to prevent disclosure of potentially valuable
ideas while they are developed. Although CBI NDA law can at times be
confusing and inequitable, that is no reason to dispense with it completely.
Courts should protect CBI truly worthy of protection while also guarding
against the enforcement of overly broad or onerous CBI NDAs.
The remaining two categories of CBI NDA case law attempt to do just
that, forming a middle ground between the Enforcement-as-Written and
Coextensivity approaches. Courts adhering to these middle-ground rules
recognize CBI as protectable, independently from trade secrets, but do not
give parties total latitude to define it. Rather, these middle-ground rules
ensure that CBI meets some substantive requirements before it is protected
via an NDA.
3. Light-Touch Reasonableness
In the first of these middle-ground categories, courts will not interpret
CBI NDAs to protect nonconfidential information or general skills and
124 See RF Lawyers, Massachusetts Adopts the Uniform Trade Secrets Act, RUDOLPH FRIEDMANN
LLP (May 8, 2019), https://www.rflawyers.com/massachusetts-adopts-the-uniform-trade-secrets-act-2/
[perma.cc/EW2M-E7QT] (“On October 1, 2018, . . . Massachusetts . . . became the second-to-last state
to adopt the Uniform Trade Secrets Act . . . .”); see also Orthofix, Inc. v. Hunter, 55 F. Supp. 3d 1005,
1012, 1015 (N.D. Ohio 2014) (holding that CBI protected by an NDA was “coterminous with information
protected by achieving trade secret status under Ohio law,” which had adopted the UTSA, and holding
that, because the plaintiff could not maintain a trade secret misappropriation claim, it could also not
maintain an NDA breach claim), rev’d, 630 F. App’x 566 (6th Cir. 2015).
125 Structural Dynamics Rsch. Corp. v. Eng’g Mechs. Rsch. Corp., 401 F. Supp. 1102, 1113 (E.D.
Mich. 1975).
126 UNIF. TRADE SECRETS ACT § 1(4).
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knowledge, but they will generally otherwise enforce CBI NDAs as written.
Hence, while these courts do apply a criterion of reasonableness to CBI
NDAs, it is applied with a “light touch,” and freedom of contract remains the
primary consideration. The rule is best stated by the Sixth Circuit in Orthofix,
Inc. v. Hunter: “‘confidential information’ is generally defined by the parties,
and not by achieving trade-secret status, so long as it does not encompass
publicly available information or an employee’s general knowledge or
skills.”127 The reasonableness inquiry thus typically focuses on whether the
information at issue is actually confidential. For instance, in McGough v.
Nalco Co., the court held that an NDA was unenforceable because it defined
CBI as “essentially all of the information provided to [the employee] during
his employment.”128 The broad scope of the NDA’s definition, in the court’s
estimation, had converted the “NDA” into an unreasonable noncompete.129
The chief virtue of the Light-Touch Reasonableness approach is that it
effectively identifies, and withholds enforcement from, the “worst-offender”
CBI NDAs. The CBI NDA in McGough, for instance, was so unreasonably
broad that, if enforced literally, employees subject to it would never be able
to find similar work again.130 Indeed, the action in McGough was triggered
by the employee’s decision to pursue alternative employment.131 Unlike the
Enforcement-as-Written approach, the Light-Touch Reasonableness rule
recognizes the deleterious effects of these contracts on employee mobility
and economic competition. Despite these benefits, however, the Light-Touch
Reasonableness rule is still used to enforce CBI NDAs that restrict employee
mobility without furthering a clear business interest.132
630 F. App’x at 574.
496 F. Supp. 2d 729, 756 (N.D. W. Va. 2007).
129 Id. In North American Paper Co. v. Unterberger, the court invalidated an NDA that protected
“any and all items of whatever nature or kind” the employee became aware of during employment,
reasoning that NDAs that “purport[] to protect virtually every kind of information” an employee learns
at her job, “even if non-confidential,” cannot be enforced. 526 N.E.2d 621, 624–25 (Ill. App. Ct. 1988).
In Unterberger, too, the court’s primary problem with the NDA seemed to be that it covered
nonconfidential information.
130 496 F. Supp. 2d at 756.
131 Id. at 736 (explaining that the employee left his employer to work for another and that his new
job entailed “rendering service” to former customers of his former employer). The employee filed for a
declaratory judgment of his rights related to the contracts he had signed with his former employer, and
the former employer counterclaimed for breach of contract. Id.
132 For one example, see Orthofix, 630 F. App’x 573–74. In that case, salesman Eric Hunter and
Orthofix signed an NDA. Id. at 569. Hunter later left Orthofix to join a competitor. Id. at 570. Orthofix
sued him when he failed to return an employee “playbook” containing information subject to the NDA.
Id. The district court found that the information in the playbook was “valuable, not readily available, and
acquired at great expense and effort by Orthofix.” Orthofix, Inc. v. Hunter, 55 F. Supp. 3d 1005, 1013
(N.D. Ohio 2014). The Sixth Circuit held Hunter had breached the NDA; it determined that, under Texas
127
128
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Ultimately, the Light-Touch Reasonableness approach, while
preferable to the categorical rules discussed above, falls short because it too
is still overly rigid. Making confidentiality the sole touchstone of the
reasonableness inquiry will lead to inequitable results in some cases. “There
is a great deal of information that is not ‘generally’ known to the public; not
all of it merits protection under a confidentiality provision.”133 Courts ought
to engage in a closer analysis of information safeguarded under a CBI NDA
to ensure that potential anticompetitive outcomes are justified by compelling
business interests. For instance, imagine an employer gave employees a
handbook containing confidential information but did not require employees
to return the handbook after leaving the company. A court might fairly
question how valuable the information in the handbook is to the employer,
given the employer has made no real effort to prevent its disclosure. The
Light-Touch Reasonableness approach would find this information
contractually protectable because it is confidential, despite its dubious
value.134 A better-reasoned approach would recognize that the employer’s
interest in such information may have to yield to the countervailing interests
of contracting employees in their mobility, as well as the public interest in
an open and competitive marketplace.
The final category of NDA enforcement cases, to which the discussion
now turns, does a better job at balancing businesses’ interests in information
protection with the integrity of economic competition and employee
mobility.
4. Close-Look Reasonableness
Like Light-Touch Reasonableness, Close-Look Reasonableness
recognizes CBI as a protectable category of business information

law, CBI “is generally defined by the parties, and not by achieving trade-secret status, so long as it does
not encompass publicly available information or an employee’s general knowledge or skills.” Orthofix,
630 F. App’x at 574. The court distinguished NDAs that protect CBI from those that prevent employees
from using general skills and knowledge, which are “more properly characterized” as noncompetes. Id.
at 573.
After Hunter resigned from Orthofix, he took his employee playbook with him because “Orthofix had
no protocol in place for departing employees to return or destroy” it. Id. at 570. One might reasonably
question the value of information that a business makes so little effort to protect. If the playbook was
truly so important to Orthofix, how was Hunter able to leave the company without returning it? See Curtis
1000, Inc. v. Suess, 24 F.3d 941, 947 (7th Cir. 1994) (arguing that, if a business did not “expend
resources” to “prevent lawful appropriation” of a “protectable interest,” “this is evidence that it is not an
especially valuable interest”). Furthermore, enforcement of the nondisclosure provisions in Orthofix had
anticompetitive effects: Hunter had left Orthofix to poach Orthofix clients at his new employer. 630 F.
App’x at 570. Because it is not clear that the information in the playbook was actually valuable to
Orthofix, the burden the Sixth Circuit’s decision placed on Hunter is difficult to justify.
133 AssuredPartners, Inc. v. Schmitt, 44 N.E.3d 463, 476 (Ill. App. Ct. 2015).
134 This example is adapted from Orthofix, Inc. v. Hunter. See supra note 132.
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independent from trade secrets. However, while Light-Touch
Reasonableness generally only requires that information under a CBI NDA
not be publicly available, Close-Look Reasonableness mandates a more
searching inquiry—a “closer look”—regarding the nature of the information
to be protected. While contractual provenance is a necessary predicate to
protection of information under this view, it is not sufficient. The
information to be protected must meet other substantive requirements, which
can vary from court to court.135
The Seventh Circuit applied Close-Look Reasonableness in Tax Track
Systems Corp. v. New Investor World, Inc. 136 In that case, Tax Track, an
insurance company, had developed a “unique spin” on leveraged life
insurance policies. 137 Tax Track recorded its idea in a memorandum
disseminated to “600 or 700 people,” but it only required at most 190 to sign
an NDA.138 Tax Track then teamed up with New Investor World to sell the
insurance and required New Investor World to sign an NDA.139 The court
found the NDA, as applied to Tax Track’s memorandum, was unenforceable
because Tax Track had not implemented “reasonable efforts” to keep the
memorandum confidential.140
Three features of Tax Track are important to understanding the CloseLook Reasonableness approach. First, Close-Look Reasonableness courts
will not protect business information under a CBI NDA solely because the
information is confidential.141 The Tax Track court did not determine that
Tax Track’s widespread distribution of the memorandum had turned the
memorandum into publicly available information. Though the memorandum
was distributed to many people, there is no indication that its existence was
generally known. 142 But this alone was not enough to protect the
memorandum with the NDA. Rather, the Tax Track court focused on Tax
Track’s treatment of the memorandum. According to the court, Tax Track’s
lax security measures (requiring at most one-third of people who saw the
memorandum to sign an NDA) indicated the memorandum was not

135 See infra note 149; see also Montville, supra note 30, at 1177 (listing various substantive
requirements courts may impose on business information protected by noncompetes).
136 See 478 F.3d 783, 787–88 (7th Cir. 2007).
137 Id. at 785.
138 Id. at 788.
139 See id. at 785–86. The NDA protected “material developed over the course of this Agreement to
facilitate the concept of Leveraged Life Insurance.” Id. at 786.
140 Id. at 788.
141 See id. at 787 (holding that, under Illinois law, NDAs will only be enforced “when the information
sought to be protected is actually confidential and reasonable efforts were made to keep it confidential”
(emphasis added)).
142 See id. at 788.
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particularly valuable.143 That the information was “not an especially valuable
interest” weakened Tax Track’s case for enforcement, even though the
information itself was apparently not widespread public knowledge.144
Second, courts applying Close-Look Reasonableness may impose
substantive protectability requirements on CBI mirroring those of trade
secret law. Tax Track’s failure to put forth “reasonable efforts” to keep the
memorandum confidential doomed its case.145 Similarly, trade secrets must
be the subject of reasonable efforts “to maintain [their] secrecy.” 146 As a
result, NDA plaintiffs in a Close-Look Reasonableness court may have
difficulty if the information they seek to protect does not qualify as a trade
secret. At the same time, however, Close-Look Reasonableness courts do not
ascribe to the Coextensivity approach’s view that trade secrets and CBI are
the same. Note that the court in Tax Track did not perform a full-dress trade
secret analysis; indeed, the court expressly stated that “Tax Track need not
show its information rises to the level of a trade secret.”147 Rather, the court
focused on one aspect of the information to be protected that is important in
trade secret law as well.
Third, Close-Look Reasonableness courts require both that the
information to be protected meets protectability requirements and that it falls
within the terms of the CBI NDA. For instance, in Tax Track, the court
focused on the memorandum because it was “the only material even
conceivably falling within” the NDA.148 Parties cannot protect information
not covered by an NDA, even if it would meet substantive protectability
requirements.149
The main deficit of the Close-Look Reasonableness approach is the
burden it can impose on contracting parties. Under the approach, careful
143 Id. at 787–88 (“If the party seeking to protect its information ‘did not think enough of it to expend
resources on trying to prevent lawful appropriation of it, this is evidence that it is not an especially
valuable interest.’” (quoting Curtis 1000, Inc. v. Suess, 24 F.3d 941, 947 (7th Cir. 1994))).
144 Id. (quoting Curtis 1000, 24 F.3d at 947).
145 See id. at 788.
146 UNIF. TRADE SECRETS ACT § 1(4)(ii) (NAT’L CONF. COMM’RS ON UNIF. STATE L. 1985).
147 478 F.3d at 787.
148 Id.
149 The “reasonable efforts” requirement is not the only requirement Close-Look Reasonableness
courts may impose on NDAs and the information protected thereunder. Other courts have required that
NDAs be narrowly tailored. In AssuredPartners, Inc. v. Schmitt, for instance, the court encountered an
NDA prohibiting an executive from disclosing “information . . . obtained by [the] Executive during the
course of [the] Executive’s employment.” 44 N.E.3d 463, 468 (Ill. App. Ct. 2015). But the NDA excluded
from its scope information that “becomes generally known.” Id. The executive was sued after he resigned
and began contacting his former employer’s customers off a list “that he had serviced during his
employment.” Id. at 469. The court rejected the plaintiffs’ argument that the “generally known” clause
saved the NDA, reasoning that not all information, even if confidential, “merits protection under a
confidentiality provision.” Id. at 476.
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drafting may not save an NDA; even NDAs that exclude publicly available
information may still be invalidated if the information does not meet
substantive criteria for protection. 150 But the Close-Look Reasonableness
rule, as seen in Tax Track, does the best job at balancing businesses’ interests
in protecting CBI with countervailing public policy considerations, including
employee mobility and the free, open exchange of business information. By
comparison, the Light-Touch Reasonableness rule tilts too strongly in favor
of businesses by holding that mere confidentiality-in-fact overrides all
interests against enforcement of a CBI NDA. The Close-Look
Reasonableness rule goes further, requiring that protection of CBI actually
be substantively reasonable, given the value of the CBI to be protected or
some other consideration.
Up until now, this Part has addressed Substantive Enforceability, that
is, the types of information that are properly the subject of a CBI NDA. The
discussion will now turn to the Scope of Enforceability, asking whether CBI
NDAs should be treated as noncompetes and, if so, what limitations should
be placed upon their scope.
B. Scope of Enforceability: How Far May a CBI NDA Extend?
After examining what types of business information courts will protect,
Montville asked when, and to what extent, courts will protect that
information. 151 In other words, may an NDA prohibit an employee from
using any protectable CBI in any respect for the rest of her life, or must some
limitations on enforcement exist? In this respect, Montville examines how
courts treat NDAs in relation to employee noncompete agreements.
Montville finds that some courts apply the same reasonableness tests to cases
regarding both NDAs and noncompetes, other courts apply noncompete
rules to NDAs in a less stringent form, and some do not apply the rules of
noncompetes to NDAs at all.152
The relation between CBI NDAs and noncompetes is important because
many courts require that noncompetes be limited in their temporal and
geographical scope or be otherwise reasonable.153 Thus, understanding the
150

See supra note 149 (discussing AssuredPartners).
Montville, supra note 30, at 1169.
152 Id. at 1180–83.
153 See, e.g., OsteoStrong Franchising, LLC v. Richter, No. 1:18-CV-1184-KWR-JFR, 2020 WL
4584007, at *8 (D.N.M. Aug. 10, 2020) (noting that New Mexico law requires “Reasonable Geographic
and Temporal Limitations” for a noncompete to be enforceable); Milliken & Co. v. Morin, 731 S.E.2d
288, 293 (S.C. 2012) (stating that noncompete agreements in South Carolina are “subject to judicial
review for reasonableness”); Disher v. Fulgoni, 464 N.E.2d 639, 643 (Ill. App. Ct. 1984) (“Illinois public
policy requires that [noncompetes’] chronological and geographical limitations, as well as the business
151
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relationship between CBI NDAs and noncompetes is critical to
understanding the Scope of Enforceability a court will give a CBI NDA. CBI
NDAs that are treated like noncompetes may be subject to reasonableness
limitations that confine the scope of their applicability, regardless of the
types of information those CBI NDAs are read to protect.154 In other words,
the Scope of Enforceability a court will give a CBI NDA entails a
fundamentally different inquiry from that of Substantive Enforceability; the
latter focuses on what types of information the CBI NDA can validly apply
to, while the former focuses on when and where that CBI NDA can be
applied. Of course, the inquiries, though distinct, may still intertwine: as will
be seen below, courts’ differing views about the types of CBI that are
properly the subject of an NDA may also inform their views regarding when
a CBI NDA should be treated as a noncompete.
The following Sections build on Montville’s analysis, discussing four
types of relationships between CBI NDAs and noncompetes advanced by
courts. Courts may (1) treat CBI NDAs and noncompetes as identical (the
“Identity Rule”); 155 (2) not subject CBI NDAs to any limitations placed on
noncompetes (the “Separation Rule”);156 (3) impose reasonableness criteria
for noncompetes on CBI NDAs only in some cases (the “Conditional Rule”);
and (4) weigh CBI NDAs’ compliance with noncompete rules as a factor,
but not a decisive one, in determining whether CBI NDAs are reasonable
(the “Factor Rule”). While some of these categories are plainly analogous to
categories described by Montville, this Note’s analysis adds nuance to his
categorization, particularly in the discussion of the Conditional and Factor
Rules.
1. The Identity Rule
Some courts categorically identify CBI NDAs, like noncompete
agreements, as contracts that restrain trade and apply the same rules of
reasonableness to both. As one court notes, “cases discussing the validity of
nondisclosure or confidentiality provisions are far fewer in number” than
cases determining the enforceability of noncompete agreements; indeed,
NDAs are often examined “in conjunction” with noncompetes.157 Thus, one

interests they seek to protect, be carefully scrutinized by the courts.”); Scott v. Gen. Iron & Welding Co.,
368 A.2d 111, 115 (Conn. 1976) (“The general rule [in Connecticut] is that the application of a restrictive
covenant will be confined to a geographical area which is reasonable in view of the particular situation.”).
154 See, e.g., Fulgoni, 464 N.E.2d at 643 (holding that NDAs and noncompetes are subject to the
same reasonableness criteria under Illinois law).
155 Montville, supra note 30, at 1180–81. Montville does not use the term “Identity Rule.”
156 Id. at 1183. Montville likewise does not use the term “Separation Rule.”
157 McGough v. Nalco Co., 496 F. Supp. 2d 729, 744 (N.D. W. Va. 2007). McGough itself does not
apply the Identity Rule, but this quotation provides one argument for its application.
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practical justification for treating CBI NDAs and noncompetes the same is
that courts handle noncompete cases more frequently, and therefore, the
criteria for determining noncompetes’ reasonableness may be more robust
and easier to follow. Additionally, employers may use both CBI NDAs and
noncompetes to “maintain[] competitive advantage.” 158 In both instances,
according to courts that follow the Identity Rule, businesses’ interests in their
competitive advantage can be furthered only to the extent they do not unduly
burden employees in their ability to change jobs and remain competitive in
the marketplace.159
The Illinois Appellate Court applied the Identity Rule in Disher v.
Fulgoni.160 In that case, an employee had signed a CBI NDA preventing him
from revealing his employer’s “client lists, marketing and business plans,
computer programs and systems,” and other information.161 The court noted
that CBI NDAs and noncompetes, even if formally distinct, often have the
same practical effects. Per Fulgoni, both CBI NDAs and noncompetes are
potentially harmful because they restrict “the flow of information necessary
for competition among businesses.”162 The court held that, in enforcing either
CBI NDAs or noncompetes, courts are obliged to consider whether such
contracts would cause an employee “undue hardship” and whether the
restraints imposed were “greater than is necessary to protect the proprietary
interests of the employer.” 163 The court thus required that the NDA be
subjected to the same durational and geographic limitations as those that
Illinois places on noncompetes in order to be enforceable.164
As seen in Fulgoni, Identity Rule courts treat formal distinctions
between CBI NDAs and noncompetes as unimportant. For these courts, the
primary consideration is not the contractual form but the purposes and
foreseeable effects of the contracts themselves. Furthermore, the Identity
Rule recognizes that CBI NDAs can impose real hardship on both employees
and on the competitiveness of the marketplace by preventing the free and
open exchange of information by employees and between competing entities.
Indeed, the mere existence of an NDA “may deter a prospective employer
from hiring a prospective employee.”165 Rather than ignoring these external
158

Id. at 756.
See Fulgoni, 464 N.E.2d at 643 (stating that NDAs and noncompetes must be interpreted so as to
“ensure that the restraint imposed will not cause undue hardship to the employee, and that it will not be
greater than is necessary to protect the proprietary interests of the employer”).
160
See id.
161 Id. at 641.
162 Id. at 643.
163 Id.
164 Id.
165 Bast, supra note 14, at 642.
159
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impacts, Identity Rule courts build them into the reasonableness analysis,
asking whether a restraint in a CBI NDA furthers employers’ legitimate
interests or whether it imposes an unnecessary cost on employee mobility.166
However, the Identity Rule does suffer from deficiencies, and chief
among them is its excessive rigidity. Not all CBI NDAs necessarily have the
same anticompetitive effects as noncompetes. Consider, for instance, the
CBI NDA in Coady v. Harpo, Inc., which, in part, prevented employees of
Oprah Winfrey’s production company from disclosing personal information
about Ms. Winfrey to others.167 This nondisclosure provision168 is narrowly
and appropriately tailored to the purpose of protecting sensitive personal
information about a famous employer from unwanted disclosure. It is
unlikely that this restriction would hinder an employee of Harpo from
leaving the company and securing a new job elsewhere (unless a potential
employer had an unusual interest in Ms. Winfrey’s personal life). Consider
also the temporal and geographic limitations many Identity Rule courts place
on CBI NDAs. These limitations may be unreasonable in cases involving
truly sensitive confidential information. As several courts have remarked,
information cannot be effectively contained in temporal or geographic
boundaries once it is disclosed.169 For instance, it would make no sense to
subject a contract like the one in Coady to temporal limitations because Ms.
Winfrey’s interest in the confidentiality of potentially embarrassing personal
information would extend indefinitely—or at least until the information
becomes public.170 The Identity Rule, in defining all CBI NDAs as identical
to noncompetes, ignores the fact that reasonableness limitations placed on
noncompetes occasionally lead to unjust or silly results when applied to CBI
NDAs.

166

See Fulgoni, 464 N.E.2d at 643.
719 N.E.2d 244, 246 (Ill. App. Ct. 1999).
168 The language of the NDA relevant to the case is as follows: employees were required to safeguard
information regarding “Ms. Winfrey and/or her business or private life” and “the business activities,
dealings or interests of Harpo and/or its officers.” Id. at 247; see also Maura Irene Strassberg, An Ethical
Rabbit Hole: Model Rule 4.4, Intentional Interference with Former Employee Non-Disclosure
Agreements and the Threat of Disqualification, Part II, 90 NEB. L. REV. 141, 172 (2011) (“In Coady, the
information at stake was likely gossip or tidbits of information about an individual who has made a
commercially valuable empire around her personality and life.”).
169 See, e.g., Bernier v. Merrill Air Eng’rs, 770 A.2d 97, 104 (Me. 2001) (explaining that
“confidentiality knows no temporal or geographical boundaries”); Coady, 719 N.E.2d at 250–51
(“[I]nterest in a celebrity figure and his or her attendant business and personal ventures somehow seems
to continue endlessly, even long after death, and often, as in the present case, extends over an international
domain.”); Zep Mfg. Co. v. Harthcock, 824 S.W.2d 654, 663 (Tex. Ct. App. 1992) (impliedly endorsing
this argument in stating that businesses “would be unable to protect their trade secrets or confidential
information” if NDAs came with temporal or geographic limitations).
170 719 N.E.2d at 250–51.
167
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2. The Separation Rule
At the opposite end of the spectrum from the Identity Rule is the
Separation Rule, which treats CBI NDAs as “entirely unburdened” by
restrictions on noncompetes. 171 The clearest example of this doctrine is
ChemiMetals, in which a chemicals distributor was contractually forbidden
from manufacturing certain products.172 Though there was no clear showing
that either the products in ChemiMetals or their method of manufacture was
confidential,173 the court found that the contract protecting that information
was an enforceable NDA and therefore did not require the contract to comply
with North Carolina’s restrictions on noncompetes. 174 In short, the court
emphasized form over substance, enforcing as a CBI NDA a contract that
had all the trade-restraining impact of a noncompete.175
The Tenth Circuit also applied the Separation Rule in Harvey Barnett,
Inc. v. Shidler. 176 This case concerned Dr. Harvey Barnett, an expert in
teaching infants to swim. 177 Dr. Barnett’s employees signed a CBI NDA
prohibiting them from disclosing “any information concerning any matters
affecting or relating to the business and trade secrets” of Dr. Barnett’s
business.178 The Tenth Circuit enforced the CBI NDA, despite an argument
from the district court that the NDA was a “disguised restrictive covenant”
(in other words, a disguised noncompete).179 The Tenth Circuit argued that
CBI NDAs and restrictive covenants (like noncompetes) “serve entirely
different purposes” and that CBI NDAs leave employees “free to work for
whomever they wish.” 180 As to the specific CBI NDA at issue, the court
found that it did not prevent the defendants from “using widely known
techniques” to teach swimming in competition with Dr. Barnett.181 Echoing
the sentiments expressed in Shidler, another court later stated that the

Montville, supra note 30, at 1183. Montville does not use the term “Separation Rule.”
ChemiMetals Processing, Inc. v. McEneny, 476 S.E.2d 374, 375 (N.C. Ct. App. 1996); see also
supra notes 98–101 and accompanying text.
173 Ehrlich & Garbarino, supra note 17, at 300; see also supra note 101 and accompanying text.
174 See supra notes 98–101 and accompanying text.
175 Ehrlich & Garbarino, supra note 17, at 300.
176 338 F.3d 1125, 1134 (10th Cir. 2003). Montville discusses Shidler himself. See Montville, supra
note 30, at 1183.
177 Shidler, 338 F.3d at 1127.
178 Id. at 1133 (citation omitted).
179 Id. at 1134.
180 Id. (quoting MAI Basic Four, Inc. v. Basis, Inc., 880 F.2d 286, 288 (10th Cir. 1989)).
181 Id.
171
172
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temporal and geographic restrictions applied to noncompete agreements
“would frequently be unreasonable” when applied to NDAs.182
The chief merit of the Separation Rule is that, unlike the Identity Rule,
it acknowledges that CBI NDAs do not always restrain trade or an
employee’s ability to secure gainful employment. Indeed, in some cases in
which CBI NDAs are appropriately and narrowly drafted, it makes little
sense to subject the CBI NDAs to the reasonableness tests applied to
noncompetes.183
However, the Separation Rule suffers from serious problems as well.
At its worst, as seen in ChemiMetals, this view simply ignores the real
anticompetitive impacts that some nominal “NDAs” can have. Businesses
should not be able to obtain the more deferential review given to CBI NDAs
in many jurisdictions (as compared to noncompetes) by cleverly drafting a
noncompete to look like a CBI NDA.184 Although the result in ChemiMetals
is particularly egregious, other cases adhering to the Separation Rule produce
anticompetitive results as well. Consider again the CBI NDA in Shidler,
which prevented the disclosure of “any information concerning any matters
affecting or relating to [Dr. Barnett’s] business [and trade secrets].”185 This
provision is extraordinarily broad, and the Tenth Circuit’s holding that it did
not prevent defendants from using “widely known techniques” to teach
swimming186 strains credulity. Even widely known swimming techniques are
arguably “related to” Dr. Barnett’s business of teaching infants how to swim.
An employee subject to such a broad CBI NDA would have cause for doubt
about her ability to compete with her employer. Such CBI NDAs, when not
effectively managed by the courts, thus may chill the formation of
competitive enterprises. Colorado law, which the court applied in Shidler,
holds that noncompetes are void except in “limited circumstances.”187 Yet
despite the potential anticompetitive effects of the Shidler NDA, the court
182 Papa John’s Int’l, Inc. v. Pizza Magia Int’l, LLC, No. CIV.A. 3:00CV-548-H, 2001 WL 1789379,
at *3 (W.D. Ky. May 10, 2001). The precise quotation from Papa John’s is as follows: “Time and
geographic restrictions which would be reasonable, under any standard, for nondisclosure agreements
would frequently be unreasonable when applied to a noncompete agreement.” Id. Given the context of
the court’s holding and its citation to Zep Manufacturing Co. v. Harthcock, however, this quotation
appears to be an error, with the court having inadvertently transposed “nondisclosure agreements” and
“noncompete agreement[s].” See id. The court states in the same paragraph that “nondisclosure
agreements implicate far fewer public policy concerns [than noncompetes] and should receive more
deferential review.” Id.
183 See supra Section III.B.1.
184 See Montville, supra note 30, at 1183 (reasoning that “substantively identical” noncompetes and
NDAs will be treated differently under this view).
185 338 F.3d at 1131 (citation omitted) (emphasis added).
186 Id. at 1134.
187 Id. at 1133.
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enforced it, allowing it to bypass the typical restrictions state law placed on
noncompetes.188
Separation Rule courts are correct that, in some cases, it makes little
sense to attach to CBI NDAs the temporal and geographic limitations often
applied to noncompetes. But these courts hold a narrow view of the purposes
of such limitations. It is a common refrain that temporal and geographical
limitations cannot be applied to CBI NDAs because the disclosure of
business information cannot be contained within such limitations.189 But such
limitations are imposed on noncompetes, at least in part, to protect
employees’ interests in their own mobility and marketability.190 By holding
that such limitations are irrelevant to CBI NDAs in all cases, Separation Rule
courts tend to grant employers maximum protection of their information
while giving minimal consideration to employee interests.
Finally, Separation Rule courts’ insistence that CBI NDAs and
noncompetes are entirely different may be untenable in light of PepsiCo, Inc.
v. Redmond’s “inevitable disclosure doctrine.” In that case, the Seventh
Circuit held that, in some circumstances, a CBI NDA may be used to restrain
an employee from leaving his employer for a competitor, under the theory
that the new position would inevitably require the employee to use
confidential information protected by a CBI NDA. 191 Redmond has been
justly criticized because it converts a CBI NDA into a noncompete after the
fact “and therefore alters the employment relationship without the
employee’s consent.”192 Nevertheless, some courts have continued applying
the doctrine.193 The fact that CBI NDAs can be converted into noncompetes
in jurisdictions applying the inevitable disclosure doctrine only casts further
doubt on the Separation Rule’s theory that the two types of contracts should
be analyzed separately.
“Middle Ground” Rules: The Conditional Rule and the Factor
Rule
While Identity Rule and Separation Rule courts find that CBI NDAs are
either just like or completely dissimilar from noncompetes, some courts take
3.

Id. at 1134 (rejecting the district court’s assertion that the NDA was a “disguised” noncompete).
See supra note 169 (listing cases).
190 See Disher v. Fulgoni, 464 N.E.2d 639, 643 (Ill. App. Ct. 1984) (reasoning that public policy
limitations such as temporal and geographical restrictions are imposed on NDAs and noncompetes to
protect against “undue hardship” to employees).
191 54 F.3d 1262, 1271–72 (7th Cir. 1995).
192 Whyte v. Schlage Lock Co., 125 Cal. Rptr. 2d 277, 293 (Ct. App. 2002).
193 See, e.g., Allied Waste Servs. of N. Am., LLC v. Tibble, 177 F. Supp. 3d 1103, 1112 (N.D. Ill.
2016) (using the inevitable disclosure doctrine in declining to dismiss a trade secret misappropriation
action).
188
189
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more moderate approaches. This Section will discuss two “middle-ground”
views courts may take in evaluating the relationship between CBI NDAs and
noncompetes. These views will be discussed together because they are not
mutually exclusive. The Conditional Rule holds that CBI NDAs will be
treated as noncompetes if they cover publicly available information and/or
general skills and knowledge. The Factor Rule finds that the reasonableness
criteria imposed on noncompetes are relevant, but not dispositive, in
determining whether a CBI NDA is enforceable—the CBI NDA’s adherence
to such criteria is merely a “factor” in determining its reasonableness.
The Sixth Circuit described the Conditional Rule in Orthofix: “a[n]
[NDA] prohibiting employees from using general knowledge, skill, and
experience acquired in their former employment is more properly
characterized as a non-compete agreement.” 194 This quotation implicitly
provides a two-step analytical framework. Under the Conditional Rule,
courts must first consider whether a CBI NDA protects publicly available
information or general skills and knowledge. Secondly, if the CBI NDA does
cover such information, it should be analyzed for reasonableness as a
noncompete. 195 While the Conditional Rule is correct that CBI NDAs
restricting access to publicly available information should be treated as
noncompetes, even more limited CBI NDAs could still have anticompetitive
impacts.196
The second middle-ground rule, the Factor Rule, is illustrated by Revere
Transducers, Inc. v. Deere & Co.197 In that case, the court found that courts
should apply the same tests to assess the reasonableness of CBI NDAs and
noncompete agreements but that “the absence of restrictions concerning time
or geographic location [(which are required of noncompetes under applicable
Iowa law)] do not render a[n] [NDA] presumptively unenforceable.”198 In
other words, while the court in Revere found that CBI NDAs and
noncompetes should be analyzed similarly, it declined to go so far as to hold
that CBI NDAs must have the same temporal and geographic limits as
194 Orthofix, Inc. v. Hunter, 630 F. App’x 566, 573 (6th Cir. 2015). For a discussion of the facts of
Orthofix, see supra note 132.
195 Service Centers of Chicago, Inc. v. Minogue provides a strong example of the Conditional Rule
in action. In that case, an employee signed an NDA prohibiting him from disclosing “information . . .
concerning or in any way relating to” his employer’s business. 535 N.E.2d 1132, 1135 (Ill. App. Ct.
1989). The court first found that this provision was “overbroad” and that the employer had failed to
establish that the information sought to be protected was not generally known. Id. at 1136–37. The court
concluded that, due to the NDA’s breadth, it was “in effect” a noncompete. Id. at 1137. It found the NDA
unenforceable because it did not have the temporal or geographical limitations Illinois requires of
noncompetes. Id.
196 See infra notes 305–306 and accompanying text.
197 See 595 N.W.2d 751, 761–62 (Iowa 1999).
198 Id.

849

NORTHWESTERN UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

noncompetes. But the court suggests that such limits are still relevant in
analyzing NDAs, reasoning that “the breadth of the [NDA’s] restrictions
regarding disclosure” goes to whether the NDA “unreasonably restricts the
employee’s rights.” 199 As Montville said, the court’s analysis “creates an
awkward middle ground, utilizing two different standards [for NDAs and
noncompetes] that turn on the contractual form rather than the contract’s
effects.”200 If a CBI NDA has the effects of a noncompete, then it should not
be able to avoid the strict judicial scrutiny of noncompetes merely by
labeling itself as a CBI NDA.201
The Factor Rule and Conditional Rule could together provide a way for
courts to analyze a CBI NDA’s Scope of Enforceability. First, courts should
apply the Conditional Rule; if they determine that the CBI NDA is in
substance a noncompete (because it protects public information or general
skills, or is otherwise significantly anticompetitive), they should require the
CBI NDA to comply with the jurisdiction’s criteria for reasonableness for
noncompetes. But when courts determine that a CBI NDA is not in substance
a noncompete, they should not require the CBI NDA to satisfy the
jurisdiction’s limitations on noncompetes but rather may simply consider
these limitations as a factor in determining whether the CBI NDA should be
enforced.
This Part has provided an overview of courts’ varying approaches to the
enforceability of CBI NDAs. In terms of the types of information a CBI NDA
is permitted to protect (Substantive Enforceability), some courts opt for total
enforcement of the contract as written, others categorically refuse to protect
information other than trade secrets, and still others work to ensure that CBI
protected by a CBI NDA meets some substantive requirements for
protectability, including those found in trade secret law. In terms of a CBI
NDA’s Scope of Enforceability, there are three approaches taken by courts:
Some courts have found that CBI NDAs must be subject to the same
limitations that the relevant jurisdiction places on noncompete agreements.
Others have held that CBI NDAs and noncompetes are different sorts of
contracts entirely. And still others have found that CBI NDAs will be treated
as noncompetes only in some instances, or that CBI NDAs’ compliance with
noncompete rules is a nondispositive factor to use in evaluating a CBI
NDA’s reasonableness. The next Part will expand the scope of this inquiry
and examine how courts have weighed the reasonableness of NDAs in other
public policy contexts.

199
200
201
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IV. PUBLIC POLICY AND NDA ENFORCEABILITY IN OTHER CONTEXTS
The discussion will now turn toward judicial treatment of NDAs in
other contexts not normally implicated in CBI NDA cases, such as cases in
which NDAs are interposed to prevent disclosure of frauds on the
government, crimes, and other information potentially in the public interest.
The use of NDAs in such instances has been a matter of scholarly interest.202
Courts faced with NDA-enforcement actions in these contexts must balance
the interest in faithful enforcement of private agreements with the public
interest in disclosure of the information at issue. Studying the application of
NDAs in these special cases, in which considerations of public policy play a
major role, will aid in discerning the considerations and methods of analysis
courts should use when evaluating CBI NDAs in the business world. In other
words, this Part attempts to get a handle on the open-ended nature of public
policy by studying the manner in which that defense has been applied to
NDAs in contexts beyond CBI.
Commentators have expressed interest in the problems posed by the
legal liability of whistleblowers for breach of NDAs. Multiple scholars have
suggested that public policy may render NDAs unenforceable against
whistleblowers in some instances. 203 Professor Carol Bast, for instance,
argues that the public benefit of a whistleblower’s disclosure of information
“must be weighed against the employer’s loss of protection for trade secrets
and proprietary information.”204 Professor Bast proposes a six-factor test for
determining whether or not an NDA should be enforced against a
whistleblower. 205 Professor Bast argues that because “public policy is

202 See, e.g., Garfield, supra note 64, at 264 (discussing 60 Minutes’ cancellation of an interview
with a former tobacco executive for fear of liability for interference with an NDA); Bast, supra note 14,
at 628 (“[A]n umbrella confidentiality agreement may very well safeguard information crucial to public
health or safety.”); Loune-Djenia Askew, Confidentiality Agreements: The Florida Sunshine in Litigation
Act, the #MeToo Movement, and Signing Away the Right to Speak, 10 U. MIA. RACE & SOC. JUST. L.
REV. 61, 64–65 (2019) (arguing that a Florida statute should be used to render unenforceable NDAs that
prevent the disclosure of sexual assault and harassment).
203 See, e.g., Garfield, supra note 64, at 297 n.188 (“[C]ourts could construe whistleblower statutes,
which prevent employers from retaliating against employees who report regulatory violations, to preclude
enforcement of contracts of silence in which employees promised not to make such a report.”); Bast,
supra note 14, at 707–08 (creating a public policy test to determine whether an NDA should be enforced
against a whistleblower).
204 Bast, supra note 14, at 701.
205 Id. at 708. The six factors are as follows:

1. what information the parties reasonably expected to be protected under the confidentiality
agreement (reasonable expectations);
2. any loss to the employer that would result if enforcement were denied (loss to employer);
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difficult to determine,”206 courts should look to other sources of law to decide
whether an NDA should be enforced against a whistleblower. For instance,
Professor Bast encourages judges to examine any “exception to the
employment at will doctrine” in their jurisdictions.207 Per Professor Bast, “if
a former employee is able to sue and collect damages for termination in
violation of public policy [under a whistleblower-based exception to the
employment-at-will doctrine],” then whistleblowers should also be able to
assert a public policy defense to the enforcement of NDAs in that
jurisdiction.208
Courts have also applied public policy to NDA counterclaims in False
Claims Act (FCA) cases. The FCA209 is a Civil War Era statute that creates
liability “for any person who knowingly submits a false claim to the
government.”210 The FCA permits private citizens, known as “relator[s],” to
file “qui tam” actions on behalf of the government against violators and to
recover a portion of the proceeds. 211 In many FCA cases, employerdefendants bring counterclaims against employee-relators for breach of their
employment NDAs. Some courts have refused to enforce NDAs in the
context of these counterclaims, finding that such counterclaims contravene
the purpose of the FCA by discouraging relators from suing their employers.
Courts have treated the conduct of relators as important in evaluating the
enforceability of NDAs: the more extensive an employee’s appropriation of

3. the extent to which the information is protectable as a trade secret or proprietary information
(protectability);
4. any substantial adverse effect enforcement of the term would have on third parties (substantial
adverse effect on third parties);
5. the likelihood that a refusal to enforce the term will contribute to the effect (exacerbation of
adverse effect); and
6. whether limited disclosure would guard against the effect while still protecting employer’s
information (limited disclosure).
Id. at 709.
206 Id. at 705.
207 Id.
208 Id. at 706. The defense of public policy in these cases may be particularly important because the
related defense of unconscionability would be more difficult to apply. Because “[u]nconscionability
focuses on the parties to the contract and asks whether one party has imposed a particularly oppressive
term on another,” NDAs preventing whistleblowing are unlikely to be found unconscionable because “the
public, and not [the whistleblower],” suffers when NDAs are enforced in such cases. Garfield, supra note
64, at 286.
209 31 U.S.C. §§ 3729–3733.
210 The False Claims Act: A Primer, U.S. DEP’T OF JUST. (Jan. 1, 2021), https://www.justice.gov/
sites/default/files/civil/legacy/2011/04/22/C-FRAUDS_FCA_Primer.pdf
[https://perma.cc/2L8RW5RC].
211 Id.
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an employer’s confidential information, the less likely that appropriation is
to be protected by public policy.212
Consideration of some courts’ approach to FCA cases 213 yields
important insights about how courts might evaluate the enforceability of an
NDA under a public policy defense. For one, courts do not approach the
public policy question using abstract principles but rather tie their
justifications for a public policy exception to the FCA’s purpose itself. This
pattern reflects the tendency of courts, discussed above, to ground public
policy arguments in legislative enactments or regulations rather than more
general principles. 214 For another, courts do not adopt a bright-line rule
applied inflexibly to every case. In other words, some courts have found that
NDA counterclaims to FCA actions are not per se barred by public policy.
Rather, courts may refuse to grant public policy protection from NDA
counterclaims to an FCA relator if the relator appropriated more information
than necessary to bring the action.215
The principles applied by courts in FCA cases have been reflected in
similar contexts. For instance, Erhart v. BofI Holding, Inc. concerned
212 For instance, in Siebert v. Gene Security Network, Inc., Siebert, an employee of a biotechnology
company, had signed an NDA obliging him to avoid disclosing CBI “for any purpose outside of the scope
of his employment.” No. 11-cv-01987-JST, 2013 WL 5645309, at *2 (N.D. Cal. Oct. 16, 2013). Siebert
later left the company and signed a separation agreement providing that he had returned all company
property and that he continued to be bound by the NDA. Id. After Siebert filed an action against the
company under the FCA, the company counterclaimed that Siebert had breached the NDA by retaining
and disclosing CBI. Id. at *6. In response, Siebert insisted that the NDA was unenforceable for purposes
of the counterclaim under public policy. Id.
While the court noted that the FCA does not explicitly address relator liability for breach of an NDA,
the court found this lack of express language immaterial, instead finding that the NDA could be
unenforceable “if a ‘substantial public interest would be impaired’” by its enforcement. Id. at *7 (quoting
United States ex rel. Green v. Northrop Corp., 59 F.3d 953, 962 (9th Cir. 1995)). The court cited several
cases limiting the enforceability of NDAs in FCA cases as a matter of public policy, id. (first citing United
States ex rel. Ruhe v. Masimo Corp., 929 F. Supp. 2d 1033, 1039 (C.D. Cal. 2012); then citing United
States v. Cancer Treatment Ctrs. of Am., 350 F. Supp. 2d 765, 773 (N.D. Ill. 2004); and then citing United
States ex rel. Head v. Kane Co., 668 F. Supp. 2d 146, 152 (D.D.C. 2009)), and argued that allowing the
counterclaim against Siebert to proceed would “frustrate Congress’ purpose in enacting the [FCA]—
namely, the public policy in favor of providing incentives for whistleblowers to come forward”—but
stopped short of dismissing the counterclaim entirely, reasoning that Siebert may also have
misappropriated confidential documents “that bore no relation” to his FCA action, id. at *8. To justify
this proposition, the court cited United States ex rel. Cafasso v. General Dynamics C4 Systems, Inc.,
637 F.3d 1047, 1052, 1062 (9th Cir. 2011), in which an employee downloaded nearly eleven gigabytes
of company data for use in an FCA action. Siebert, 2013 WL 5645309, at *7. In Cafasso, the Ninth Circuit
sustained the lower court’s grant of summary judgment for the employer against the employee on the
employer’s NDA-breach counterclaim, holding that, even if a public policy defense for FCA relators
existed, it could not apply to relators such as Cafasso who engage in “vast and indiscriminate
appropriation” of information. 637 F.3d at 1062.
213 See supra note 212 for various examples.
214 See supra note 77.
215 See supra note 212.
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Charles Erhart, an internal auditor at a bank who reported “wrongful”
conduct to the government. 216 Erhart sued the bank, alleging it retaliated
against him for this reporting, and the bank counterclaimed, alleging that
Erhart had breached his NDA, which prohibited him from revealing
“proprietary and confidential” information. 217 The court engaged in an
unusually thorough analysis of the public policy defense to determine if the
counterclaim should proceed, specifically identifying and weighing the
interests for and against enforcement of the NDA. First, the court contended,
interests in freedom of contract favored the enforcement of the NDA.218 The
court next argued that enforcing the NDA would serve the fundamental
purposes of trade secret law, including “promoting the sharing of knowledge,
incentivizing innovation, and maintaining commercial ethics.”219 However,
the court also found public interests counseling against enforcement. For
instance, the court noted that California law prohibits retaliation in some
instances against whistleblowing employees.220
The court also considered the fact that Erhart had engaged in several
courses of conduct allegedly violative of the NDA, including reporting
information to the government, taking the bank’s files, and sending some of
the files to his mother and placing them on his girlfriend’s computer.221 The
court separately evaluated the enforceability of the NDA with respect to
these discrete actions, finding that the NDA was clearly unenforceable with
respect to Erhart’s report to the government but may have been enforceable
to prevent Erhart from transferring the information to his mother and using
his girlfriend’s computer if Erhart’s motivation in doing so was not to protect
information.222 The Erhart court’s thorough and lucid public policy analysis
provides an excellent example of how the defense works in practice when
applied to NDAs. The court drew from a wide body of law to determine what
substantive interests counseled for and against enforcement of the NDA and,
like the courts in the FCA cases, considered Erhart’s specific conduct to
determine whether it was worthy of public policy protection.223
216

No. 15-cv-02287-BAS-NLS, 2017 WL 588390, at *1 (S.D. Cal. Feb. 14, 2017).
Id. at *1–3.
218 Id. at *8.
219 Id.
220 Id. at *9.
221 Id. at *10.
222 Id. at *15.
223 Id. at *8–17 (discussing California’s public policy favoring freedom of contract, the policies of
trade secret law, federal law illustrating an interest in protecting “nonpublic personal information,”
California and federal law protecting whistleblowers, and other legal factors in determining the
enforceability of the NDA, and considering Erhart’s conduct, including reporting information to the
government and transmission of information to his mother, as relevant in determining the balance of
public policy).
217
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Occasionally, NDA defendants allege that an NDA should not be
enforceable because it is being used to conceal crimes or restrain the
defendant’s freedom of speech. The defendant made these arguments, for
instance, in National Abortion Federation v. Center for Medical Progress.224
In that case, the Center for Medical Progress (CMP), an organization that
opposes abortion, infiltrated a meeting of the National Abortion Federation
(NAF).225 CMP personnel signed NDAs upon arriving at the meeting that
prevented them from disclosing information learned at the meeting and
provided for injunctive relief in the case of a breach. 226 The group
surreptitiously recorded conversations with the event’s attendees and
claimed that some of these conversations referenced illegal sales of fetal
body tissue. 227 When NAF sought to prevent the public release of these
recordings, CMP insisted that the NDAs were contrary to public policy and
that injunctive relief would constitute “an unconstitutional prior restraint” on
its freedom of expression.228 The court rejected CMP’s arguments, deciding
that the recordings did not evidence any criminal wrongdoing.229 The court
went on to balance several factors bearing on the NDA’s enforceability. For
instance, the court concluded that NAF had a strong interest in the
enforcement of its NDAs because abortion providers are frequently subject
to threats and violence.230 The court also found that CMP had voluntarily
waived its First Amendment rights231 and also discussed the public’s interest
in the information CMP had collected. CMP claimed that its recordings
demonstrated “a remarkable de-sensitization in the attitudes of [abortion]
industry participants” and that the public had an interest in such
information.232 The court rejected this argument, holding that “th[e] sort of
information [CMP had collected] is already fully part of the public debate
over abortion.”233 But the court noted that public policy could support “the
release of a small subset of records . . . that defendants believe show criminal
wrongdoing . . . to law enforcement agencies.”234
NAF is a persuasive application of public policy to an NDA. The court
properly considered NAF’s interest in enforcing its agreement and weighed
224
225
226
227
228
229
230
231
232
233
234

No. 15-cv-03522-WHO, 2016 WL 454082, at *3 (N.D. Cal. Feb. 5, 2016).
Id. at *3.
Id. at *4–5.
Id. at *1.
Id. at *1–2, *19.
Id. at *19.
Id. at *20.
Id. at *17–18.
Id. at *19.
Id.
Id. at *20.
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that interest against CMP’s constitutional and public interest arguments. The
court also conducted a detailed inquiry into the nature of the information
recorded to determine if its release was in the public interest.235 Furthermore,
the court considered CMP’s planned conduct as relevant in determining the
balance of public policy. The court did not permit CMP to do what it
probably really wanted to (release the recordings), but it did suggest (though
did not clearly decide) that limited disclosures to law enforcement might be
permitted.236
Upon careful observation, one may notice some common threads
running through the public policy analyses in NAF and the other cases in this
Part. Most perform at least some balancing between the parties’ interest in
enforcing the NDA and the public interest in disclosure. Many also find the
disclosing parties’ conduct relevant in determining whether their actions are
worth protecting. Several of the cases predicate their public policy decisions
on the purpose and language of constitutional and statutory provisions. Also
relevant, as demonstrated in NAF, is the character of the information at issue
and the strength of the public’s interest in its disclosure.
The next Part will discuss the factors courts should consider in
determining whether a CBI NDA is enforceable as a matter of public policy,
drawing upon issues raised in the cases examined thus far.
V. CBI NDAS: A PROPOSED PUBLIC POLICY APPROACH
This final Part will explore how courts should evaluate the
enforceability of CBI NDAs by using the public policy defense. It will
propose a judicial framework for courts to use in addressing the
enforceability of CBI NDAs and will apply the elements of that framework
to the Tesla case discussed in the Introduction. In determining whether a CBI
NDA should be enforced as a matter of public policy, courts should consider:
(1) the strength of the interest in favor of enforcing the CBI NDA, measured
by:
(a) the extent to which the CBI NDA was freely negotiated between
equally competent parties; and
(b) the extent to which enforcing the CBI NDA would further the
policies of trade secret law; and
(2) the strength of the interest against enforcing the CBI NDA, measured by:
(a) the extent to which the CBI NDA resembles a noncompete
agreement in purpose or effect;

235
236
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(b) the CBI NDA’s compliance with rules of reasonableness applied
to noncompetes in the jurisdiction; and
(c) the CBI NDA’s predictable adverse impact on other public
interests.

A. Interests Favoring Enforcement of a CBI NDA
1.

The Extent to Which the CBI NDA Was Freely Negotiated
Between Equally Competent Parties
There is a consistently recognized public policy interest in the ability of
contracting parties to order their own affairs as they see fit.237 But this interest
is not uniformly strong in all cases. The doctrine of unconscionability, and
particularly procedural unconscionability, recognizes that the public interest
in enforcing an agreement diminishes when that agreement was the product
of unfair negotiations between parties of disparate sophistication and
resources. 238 The concern that contracts are the product of inequitable
bargaining is particularly powerful in cases involving business NDAs. Many
business NDA cases concern a business entity and a former employee of that
entity.239 CBI NDAs signed by employees “are often more broadly worded
[than business-to-business NDAs] and less likely to include express
exceptions for non-secret information.”240 Employees who “generally lack
negotiating power or legal advice” are powerless in the face of these take-itor-leave-it CBI NDAs. 241 These types of agreements have become “so
widespread in certain industries [that] employees frequently have little
choice but to accept” them.242 Thus, while freedom of contract is a public
policy supporting contractual enforcement, the strength of that policy may
be diminished in the context of employee-signed CBI NDAs, in which the
choice to accept the terms of the contract may not be truly free.243
237

See supra note 64 and accompanying text.
See supra note 77 (noting unconscionability’s application to unduly one-sided bargains).
239 Many NDA cases discussed thus far fit this description. See supra Part III.
240 Charles Tait Graves, Trade Secrecy and Common Law Confidentiality: The Problem of Multiple
Regimes, in THE LAW AND THEORY OF TRADE SECRECY: A HANDBOOK OF CONTEMPORARY RESEARCH
77, 88 (Rochelle C. Dreyfuss & Katherine J. Strandburg eds., 2011).
241 Id.
242 Montville, supra note 30, at 1188.
243 Courts do not appear to routinely refer to the procedural unconscionability of CBI NDAs in public
policy analyses. This Note proposes that courts consider this factor in the public policy analyses because
procedural unconscionability is arguably a common feature of employee NDAs, as discussed in this
paragraph. However, it would not be entirely novel to refer to procedural unconscionability as the basis
for a public policy defense. See, e.g., Kincaid v. Com. Credit Corp., No. CIV.A 2:98-0842, 1999 WL
33510175 (S.D. W. Va. Nov. 16, 1999). In Kincaid, the plaintiff entered into a contract that included an
arbitration provision. Id. at *2. The plaintiff contended the arbitration agreement was void on a number
238
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In other words, courts ought to determine if a CBI NDA is procedurally
unconscionable when determining whether to enforce it. Procedural
unconscionability “refers to relative unfairness in the negotiating process.”244
The “key elements” of procedural unconscionability are oppression, or “an
inequality of bargaining power which results in no real negotiation and an
absence of meaningful choice,” and surprise, which “involves the extent to
which the supposedly agreed-upon terms of the bargain are hidden in a prolix
printed form drafted by the party seeking to enforce the disputed terms.”245
It may be argued that this part of the test immediately stacks the deck
against employers because, many, if not most, employee CBI NDAs suffer
from at least some degree of procedural unconscionability.246 Perhaps so, but
this fact indicates a potential infirmity in corporate culture generally rather
than a problem with the test itself. The entire point of procedural
unconscionability is that one-sided contracts deserve particular scrutiny. If
employee CBI NDAs are systematically one-sided, then systemic change is
needed, unless we are to do away with procedural unconscionability
altogether for employment contracts. Businesses could adopt multiple
strategies to mitigate the one-sided nature of their CBI NDAs and other
employment contracts, including drafting them in simple, plain English;
offering prospective employees opportunities to negotiate or at the very least
seek clarification regarding contract terms; and affording prospective
employees an opportunity to seek counsel at reduced or no cost to assist them
in understanding the agreements. 247 Furthermore, the procedural
unconscionability of the CBI NDA is just one factor for courts to consider
under this test; this alone would not sink a CBI NDA plaintiff’s case (except,
perhaps, in extreme cases). Additionally, there are situations, as seen below,
in which high-level executives and other employees experienced in contract

of grounds, including public policy. Id. at *5. The sole basis for the public policy defense was that the
contract was procedurally unconscionable. Id. at *5 n.2. The court denied the defendant’s motion to
compel arbitration, holding it was “premature” in light of the plaintiff’s multiple arguments against
enforceability. Id. at *6.
244 Mark A. Glick, Darren Bush & Jonathan Q. Hafen, The Law and Economics of Post-Employment
Covenants: A Unified Framework, 11 GEO. MASON L. REV. 357, 389 (2002).
245 Id. at 389–90 (second and third quotations quoting A & M Produce Co. v. FMC Corp., 186 Cal.
Rptr. 114, 122 (Ct. App. 1982)).
246 See supra notes 239–243 and accompanying text.
247 See Frank’s Maint. & Eng’g, Inc. v. C. A. Roberts Co., 408 N.E.2d 403, 410 (Ill. App. Ct. 1980)
(“Factors to be considered [in determining whether a contract is procedurally unconscionable] are all the
circumstances surrounding the transaction including the manner in which the contract was entered into,
whether each party had a reasonable opportunity to understand the terms of the contract, and whether
important terms were hidden in a maze of fine print; both the conspicuousness of the clause and the
negotiations relating to it are important, albeit not conclusive factors in determining the issue of
unconscionability.”).
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negotiations will have a tougher time arguing their CBI NDAs are
procedurally unconscionable.
Furthermore, this Note does not argue that CBI NDAs should be subject
to a full-dress unconscionability analysis. As pointed out above, courts have
as of late applied unconscionability quite rigidly, rendering it difficult to
apply to all contracts that threaten social values. 248 The test offered here
focuses specifically on the prong of procedural unconscionability.
Procedural unconscionability evidences a public policy preferring freely
negotiated contracts between equal parties to adhesive bargains between
unequal parties. Procedural unconscionability, in other words, is evidence
that the public interest in contractual enforcement is comparatively
diminished when a court encounters a contract in which one side did not have
a real opportunity to influence its terms.
One case applying procedural unconscionability in significant detail is
Farrar v. Direct Commerce, Inc.249 In that case, Wilson Farrar, a high-level
executive, had negotiated and entered into an employment contract with
Direct Commerce.250 The contract included a confidentiality provision that
Farrar insisted she had not had an opportunity to negotiate.251 The court first
identified several factors that militated against a finding of procedural
unconscionability, noting that Farrar was an experienced businesswoman,
negotiating for a high-level position, who “held herself out as being
experienced in contract negotiations.”252 These factors made it more likely
that the CBI NDA had been formed between parties of equal bargaining
power, unlike agreements between business entities and low-level
employees.253 The court, however, did not end the analysis there. It further
explained that there was evidence Farrar had not been permitted to negotiate
the agreement’s confidentiality provision, which all other employees at the
company were also required to sign.254 Based on these facts, the court found
that there was some degree of procedural unconscionability in Farrar’s
confidentiality provision.255
Other courts have not taken Farrar’s approach. For instance, the court
in Ryan v. Dan’s Foods Stores refused to find unconscionable a preprinted,
nonnegotiable, employer-drafted agreement, concluding that virtually “all
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See supra note 77.
See 215 Cal. Rptr. 3d 785, 789–93 (Ct. App. 2017).
Id. at 788.
Id. at 789.
Id. at 792.
Id.
Id. at 793.
Id. The court, however, did not seem to think this degree was very significant. Id. at 794–95.
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employment contracts are drafted by the employer,” and that “standard
forms . . . are common for employment contracts.’” 256 The court further
found that “if the employee is unhappy with the terms offered by the
employer the employee can either refuse to accept or quit employment and
find a job with more favorable terms.”257
The Ryan court’s arguments are unpersuasive. The fact that employerdrafted contracts are common does not somehow make them less one-sided.
If anything, these contracts’ ubiquity provides courts with all the more reason
to scrutinize them for procedural fairness. Similarly, the Ryan court’s
insistence that employees who are unsatisfied with their contracts just find a
different job is blind to the reality that, as discussed above, restrictive
employment agreements may practically be a prerequisite to working in
certain industries.258 Courts evaluating the procedural fairness of CBI NDAs
should follow Farrar, asking how sophisticated the particular employee
entering the contract was, whether the employee had experience in contract
negotiations, whether the contract was standard-form and binding on all
employees, and whether there was an opportunity for the employee to
negotiate the contract.259 There is a weaker public policy interest in enforcing
contracts that are procedurally unconscionable under this analysis.
To illustrate these principles, recall the Tesla case discussed at the
beginning of this Note. All Tesla employees are required to “sign the Tesla,
Inc. Employee Nondisclosure And Inventions Assignment Agreement.”260
This standard-form agreement is a dense document filled with terms that
likely would not be fully understood by someone without legal training.261

256

Glick et al., supra note 244, at 395–96 (alteration in original) (quoting Ryan v. Dan’s Foods
Stores, 972 P.2d 395, 404 (Utah 1998)).
257 Id. at 396.
258 See supra note 104 and accompanying text.
259 See supra notes 249–255 and accompanying text.
260 Complaint, supra note 2, at 5.
261 Tesla’s CBI NDA, for example, provided:
Notwithstanding the foregoing, Proprietary Information excludes any information that is or
lawfully becomes part of the public domain. I agree that, in any dispute related to this agreement,
I will bear the burden of proving by clear and convincing evidence the applicability of this
exclusion. This Agreement is intended to supplement, and not to supersede, any rights the
Company may have in law or equity with respect to the protection of trade secrets or confidential
or proprietary information.
....
I have been notified and understand that the provisions of Section 2.6 of this Agreement do not
apply to any Company Invention (defined below) that qualifies fully as a nonassignable invention
under the provisions of Section 2870 of the California Labor Code . . . .
....
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There is no indication that any of the former Tesla employees in the case are
particularly experienced in contract negotiations; indeed, there is no
evidence that the defendants received any opportunity to negotiate the NDA.
In sum, because the NDA is a difficult-to-understand standard-form contract
presented on a take-it-or-leave it basis to (likely) inexperienced employees,
it is at least somewhat procedurally unconscionable, which weakens the
public policy interest in its enforcement.
2.

The Extent to Which Enforcing the CBI NDA Would Further the
Purposes of Trade Secret Law
The next factor asks courts to analyze the strength of the parties’ interest
in protecting CBI, using the public policy of trade secret law. A business’s
interest in enforcing its CBI NDA will be more clearly supported by public
policy if the information protected resembles a trade secret—meaning it
satisfies one or more UTSA requirements for trade secret protection 262 —
while the pro-enforcement interest will be lessened if the information is
unlike a trade secret. Although trade secret law does not directly govern
contractual actions, it is useful in identifying varieties of business
information that public policy has deemed worthy of protection. Because
public policy is an open-ended defense that allows courts to identify relevant
policies beyond directly controlling law,263 it is legitimate for courts to look
to trade secret law to determine the protectability of CBI under a CBI NDA.
After all, as the Sixth Circuit has said, trade secret law is “relevant in
analyzing the reasonableness and enforceability of [NDAs] because, in order
to justify the contractual restraint, information subject to [NDAs] must share
at least some characteristics with information protected by trade secret
statutes.”264
However, one may argue courts should not look to trade secret law
when enforcing CBI NDAs. Some may contend that the law of trade secrets
is irrelevant in CBI NDA cases because the foundation of contractual
liability in such cases is the CBI NDA itself, while trade secret law
concentrates instead on the nature of the information to be protected.265 It

I acknowledge and agree that violation of this Agreement by me may cause the Company
irreparable harm and that the Company shall therefore have the right to . . . specific performance,
or other equitable relief, without bond and without prejudice to any other rights and remedies . . . .
See id. Ex. A, at 1, 3.
262 See supra Section III.A.2 (noting the three UTSA requirements of secrecy, economic value, and
reasonable efforts to maintain secrecy in order to qualify for trade secret protection).
263 See supra Part II.
264 Orthofix, Inc. v. Hunter, 630 F. App’x 566, 568 (6th Cir. 2015).
265 For an articulation of a similar view from the Eleventh Circuit, see supra note 62 and
accompanying text.

861

NORTHWESTERN UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

could also be said that subjecting CBI NDAs to trade secret law would defeat
the purpose of CBI NDAs, which may be intended to provide businesses with
legal protection broader than that they would receive under trade secret
law.266 Finally, those who oppose applying the law of trade secrets to CBI
NDAs may point to the UTSA’s nonpreemption of contract actions, which
may indicate a lack of intent to disturb the scope or enforceability of CBI
NDAs.267
These arguments are not without force. The fact that the UTSA does
not preempt contractual actions, for instance, makes it difficult to argue that
CBI NDAs can only protect trade secrets (though, as discussed above, some
courts have tried).268 But this Note does not argue that all information under
a CBI NDA must be a trade secret; rather, it contends that CBI’s resemblance
to trade secrets is a factor courts should consider in determining if a CBI
NDA is supported by public policy. Furthermore, while a bargain between
parties is an essential prerequisite to contractual liability, contractual liability
is not unlimited. The entire point of the public policy defense is that some
contractual relationships will not be recognized because doing so would
significantly harm some public interest. The reason courts should consider
trade secret law when presented with a CBI NDA is to gauge the strength of
the parties’ interest in the enforcement of their private bargain. The UTSA
effectively articulates a public policy that information bearing certain
characteristics is worthy of legal protection. This public policy would be
furthered by protecting CBI that has some or all of those characteristics,
while CBI not bearing any of those characteristics is less clearly valuable.
Finally, the UTSA “did not take a stand one way or the other on
interpretation of confidentiality contracts.”269 Indeed, “it is unclear whether
the statute’s drafters . . . believed that such contracts would be interpreted in
line with official trade secret law.” 270 While the UTSA does not preempt
contract actions, the statute does not say that its provisions are wholly
irrelevant in interpreting a CBI NDA and determining its appropriate scope.
Nothing in the UTSA’s text prevents courts from considering the
requirements of trade secret law as a source of public policy when evaluating
contractual actions to protect information that often resembles trade secrets.
The remainder of this Section discusses the policies of trade secret law
that courts should consider in evaluating CBI NDAs’ enforceability. One
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UNIF. TRADE SECRETS ACT § 7(b)(1) (NAT’L CONF. COMM’RS ON UNIF. STATE L. 1985).
See supra Section III.A.2.
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Id.
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purpose of trade secret law is promoting commercial morality.271 Sanctioning
trade secret misappropriation disincentivizes businesses from engaging in
undesirable strategies to obtain business information.272 The UTSA’s drafters
distinguished proper means of appropriation of trade secrets from wrongful
misappropriation.273 In light of this strong policy, courts should consider the
particular conduct that was alleged to violate a CBI NDA’s provisions and
how seriously that conduct conflicts with standards of commercial morality.
For example, courts have less reason to punish minor or unintentional
misappropriation of CBI, as opposed to widespread, indiscriminate, or
malicious misappropriation.274
Another critical policy underlying trade secret law is uniformity. The
UTSA’s drafters bemoaned the “uneven” development of trade secret law
and the “undue uncertainty” in American courts “concerning the parameters
of trade secret protection.”275 Uniformity is desirable in business information
law because we live in an increasingly “national and global economy”276 and
it would therefore be beneficial for businesses to be able to develop
confidentiality strategies with the assurance that the law will be applied
similarly in all the jurisdictions in which they do business. Uniformity can
pose a significant issue in CBI NDA cases; as discussed above, courts in
different jurisdictions approach these actions very differently, with attitudes
ranging from complete enforcement of CBI NDAs as written to absolute
denial of contractual protection to CBI.277 Courts should attempt to remedy
this widespread uncertainty in the law of CBI NDAs to bring it closer in line
with the goals of trade secret law.
The next several paragraphs will examine the UTSA’s various elements
of the definition of a trade secret. Recall that the UTSA defines a “trade
secret” as
information, including a formula, pattern, compilation, program, device,
method, technique, or process, that: (i) derives independent economic value,
actual or potential, from not being generally known to, and not being readily
ascertainable by proper means by, other persons who can obtain economic value
271 See Unikel, supra note 48, at 845 & n.22; see also Kewanee Oil Co. v. Bicron Corp., 416 U.S.
470, 481 (1974) (“The maintenance of standards of commercial ethics and the encouragement of
invention are the broadly stated policies behind trade secret law.”).
272 See Unikel, supra note 48, at 846.
273 See UNIF. TRADE SECRETS ACT § 1 cmt. (NAT’L CONF. COMM’RS ON UNIF. STATE L. 1985).
274 For an application of this argument in the context of an NDA counterclaim to an FCA action, see
supra note 212 and accompanying text, which discusses Cafasso v. General Dynamics C4 Systems, Inc.,
637 F.3d 1047, 1062 (9th Cir. 2011).
275 UNIF. TRADE SECRETS ACT, Prefatory Note at 1.
276 See H.R. REP. NO. 114-529, at 4 (2016) (discussing the federal Defend Trade Secrets Act of 2016).
277 See supra Part III for a full discussion of the differing approaches courts have taken.
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from its disclosure or use, and (ii) is the subject of efforts that are reasonable
under the circumstances to maintain its secrecy.278

Courts evaluating a CBI NDA’s enforceability may focus on some, but
not all, requirements of trade secret law. For instance, in denying
enforcement of an NDA in Tax Track, the Seventh Circuit focused on the
fact that the plaintiff had not put forth “reasonable efforts” to maintain the
relevant information’s confidentiality.279 However, courts should take a more
holistic approach, evaluating how closely CBI resembles a trade secret with
reference to all of the elements of the UTSA’s definition while recognizing
that CBI need not meet all, or even any, of the elements to be protected.
Trade secret law is evidence of a public policy interest in protecting
information with certain characteristics. There is less likely to be a public
policy problem with a CBI NDA if it protects CBI that has all or most of
these characteristics. But even CBI that is entirely unlike a trade secret could
still be worthy of protection if some other interest justifies the contractual
restraint. In other words, CBI’s similarity to a trade secret is merely one
factor among many for courts to consider in the public policy analysis. It is
not determinative by itself, though it will certainly be more difficult to argue
that information that is valueless, publicly available, or not subject to
reasonable protective efforts should be protected.
Consider first the requirement that trade secrets may not be generally
known. As noted above, secrecy may be the most essential attribute of a trade
secret. 280 Secrecy should be almost as important in the context of CBI NDAs.
“If the term ‘confidential business information’ is to be given its plain
meaning, the information must in fact be ‘confidential.’”281 Courts should
regard with intense suspicion any CBI NDA prohibiting the disclosure of
publicly available information or general skills and knowledge. Such
agreements should rarely be enforceable, at least not to their full extent.
Next, consider the requirement that trade secrets cannot be readily
ascertainable. In other words, trade secrets cannot be easily accessible in
publicly available materials or “easily gleaned from products that are on the
market” or through reverse engineering. 282 The fact that information is
readily ascertainable indicates that a business’s economic interest in that
information is limited and defeasible. However, not all courts have followed
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Ehrlich & Garbarino, supra note 17, at 297.
See Sandeen, A Contract by Any Other Name, supra note 41, at 135.
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this logic, 283 and Robert Unikel has urged that the “not . . . ‘readily
ascertainable by proper means’” requirement should be discarded, arguing
that it unreasonably rewards defendants who improperly acquire information
that “theoretically” could have been obtained properly.284
However, there is good reason to think that readily ascertainable
information should be less presumptively protectable than other information.
The fact that information can be ascertained through public channels
suggests either that the business seeking to protect the information did not
develop it or that it put forth insufficient efforts to protect it from disclosure.
Protecting such information would confer marginal private benefits at best,
while risking the adverse public impacts that have been discussed throughout
this piece. 285 Furthermore, when deciding whether to protect information
under a CBI NDA, courts could consider both whether the information could
have been obtained by proper means and whether the defendants actually
obtained the information by proper means.
Finally, courts should ask whether CBI NDA plaintiffs undertook
reasonable efforts to maintain the confidentiality of the information to be
protected.286 This requirement gets at not only the secrecy of CBI but also at
its value: even if information is actually confidential and there is no evidence
it has been widely disclosed, a court may rightly ask how valuable it is if the
business has not tried to protect it.287 In the context of trade secret actions,
some courts have held that the act of requiring employees to sign NDAs is
by itself enough to establish that a business has undertaken such reasonable
efforts. 288 This is an odd position that will not be followed here. Simply
assuming that employees will abide by an NDA they may not have read or

283

For instance, in H. J. Sherwood, Inc. v. Fibeco, Inc., three defendants left their employer to start
their own business and produced a ceramic core “very close in composition, manufacture and use” to that
made by their former employer. 234 N.E.2d 531, 531–32 (Ohio C.P. 1967). As a defense to the
employer’s NDA breach action, the defendants insisted that the core’s manufacturing method was
publicly available “and that anyone could go to various libraries” and learn the process for themselves.
Id. at 532. The court, however, rejected this defense. See id. at 533.
284 Unikel, supra note 48, at 876.
285 See Curtis 1000, Inc. v. Suess, 24 F.3d 941, 947 (7th Cir. 1994) (“If the firm claiming a
protectable interest did not think enough of it to expend resources on trying to prevent lawful
appropriation of it, this is evidence that it is not an especially valuable interest . . . .”).
286 As to the public policy of the trade secret requirement that businesses be able to derive value from
the information at issue, UNIFORM TRADE SECRETS ACT § 1(4) (NAT’L CONF. COMM’RS ON UNIF. STATE
L. 1985), courts should prefer the enforcement of NDAs that protect information directly related to the
moneymaking power of a business.
287 See supra Section III.A.4 (discussing Tax Track); see also Curtis 1000, 24 F.3d at 947 (“If the
firm claiming a protectable interest did not think enough of it to expend resources on trying to prevent
lawful appropriation of it, this is evidence that it is not an especially valuable interest . . . .”).
288 Tracey, supra note 36, at 66.
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understood289 without taking further actions to secure important information
from unwanted disclosure hardly appears to be a “reasonable effort” to
maintain confidentiality. Contrast, for instance, this “NDA-only” approach
with Tesla’s more comprehensive information-security measures, including
security guards, cameras, and a requirement that Tesla employees
accompany outside visitors to Tesla facilities.290 Furthermore, finding that
CBI NDAs alone evidence reasonable efforts to maintain confidentiality
would render the reasonable-efforts requirement meaningless in the context
of this public policy test, as all CBI NDA plaintiffs could show that they
engaged in such reasonable efforts simply by pointing to the CBI NDA
signed by the defendant.
With these considerations for the interest in favor of enforcing the CBI
NDA based on trade secret law policies in mind, one may turn again to the
Tesla case for an example of their application. The first question is whether
enforcing the CBI NDA in this case would further trade secret law’s interest
in protecting commercial morality. On one hand, Tesla did not allege in its
initial complaint that any of the former employees in the case sent Rivian
information; all that it alleged is that the employees took some documents
with them upon leaving the company.291 On the other hand, Tesla suggests
that the employees took information at Rivian personnel’s request. 292
Enforcing the CBI NDA against the former employees would thus seem to

289 A counterargument here might be that employers are entitled to assume that employees who have
signed an NDA have read and understood its terms and will abide by them; that, after all, is the entire
point of a contract. This argument might have a certain legalistic appeal, but it is out of step with
commonsense knowledge about human behavior. It is a matter of common knowledge that humans
routinely enter into contracts that they have not read and would have no hope of understanding without
the assistance of a lawyer. Consider, for instance, if you read and understood the terms and conditions of
the last website you visited. A business that did nothing to protect its secrets but had employees sign a
boilerplate contract would have no reasonable expectation that their CBI and trade secrets have been
effectively protected from unwanted disclosure. Courts therefore have reason to assume that employers
who do no more than require employees to sign an NDA are not terribly concerned about unwanted
disclosure of company information.
290 See infra note 300 and accompanying text.
291 See Demurrer, supra note 8, at 8–10 (“Tesla strains to plead misappropriation despite having to
concede that each of these employees cooperated with Tesla to delete every one of the documents Tesla
contends belongs to it, and that they did so . . . before joining Rivian, and without sending the documents
to any Rivian email address or copying any of the documents onto any Rivian system.”). Tesla’s third
amended complaint does contain allegations that Rivian has actually acquired Tesla information, but these
allegations are, in the main, highly conclusory. See, e.g., Third Amended Complaint, supra note 7, at 9
(“Rivian has acquired the Tesla confidential information taken by Wong. Wong has begun work at Rivian
and, on information and belief, has used the Tesla confidential information for Rivian’s benefit and on
Rivian’s systems.”).
292 See, e.g., Complaint, supra note 2, at 6 (“Before [Kim] Wong left Tesla, [Rivian employee Vince]
Duran instructed her that Rivian did not have the recruiting templates, structures, formulas, or documents
that would be needed for Rivian’s recruitment efforts.” (emphasis omitted)).
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have some impact on commercial morality (thwarting Rivian’s alleged
misappropriation campaign against Tesla); however, there is not a great deal
of evidence that this misconduct caused actual harm if no documents have
actually made their way to Rivian.293 Next, consider the policy of uniformity.
The CBI NDA in this case is incredibly broad, purporting to protect “all
information” accessible by Tesla employees, subject to a narrow exception
for “information that is or lawfully becomes part of the public domain” (the
employee must prove this exception applies by clear and convincing
evidence). 294 Few jurisdictions would enforce such a broad CBI NDA as
written, 295 so those few jurisdictions enforcing it would create a lack of
uniformity in the law of business information.
Next, one may ask whether the information protected by the CBI NDA
satisfies UTSA requirements. Tesla’s CBI NDA likely applies to information
that is readily ascertainable by proper means; as stated, it purports to cover
nearly all information Tesla employees learned at the company.296 For the
same reason, the CBI NDA likely covers information of no economic value
to Tesla. Though the CBI NDA claims it does not apply to information that
“is or lawfully becomes part of the public domain,” employees must prove
the applicability of this exception with “clear and convincing evidence.”297
Moreover, according to Rivian, some of the information Tesla alleges was
misappropriated is publicly available online.298 Other information in the case,
however, such as manufacturing information,299 is less likely to be publicly
available and therefore may be worthier of protection. With respect to the
“reasonable efforts” requirement, Tesla states that it uses security measures,
including guards and cameras, at its facilities and that visitors must be
accompanied by Tesla employees. 300 While these efforts appear to be
reasonable insofar as Tesla seeks to protect genuine CBI, the CBI NDA is so
broad that it encompasses information likely not the subject of reasonable
security efforts. In short, Tesla’s CBI NDA is so broad that it likely includes

293 See supra note 272 and accompanying text (noting trade secret law’s objective of preventing
businesses from using morally unsavory strategies to acquire business information).
294 Complaint, supra note 2, Ex. A.
295 See Ehrlich & Garbarino, supra note 17, at 298 (stating that only two jurisdictions “take a pure
freedom of contract approach to CBI NDAs”). Such an approach is analogous to the Enforcement-asWritten approach discussed supra Section III.A.1.
296 See Demurrer, supra note 8, at 9 & n.2 (arguing and providing citations suggesting that recruiting
information Tesla sought to protect is publicly available).
297 Complaint, supra note 2, Ex. A.
298 See Demurrer, supra note 8, at 9 & n.2.
299 Complaint, supra note 2, at 9.
300 Id. at 5.

867

NORTHWESTERN UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

information with little resemblance to trade secrets. The court should view
the CBI NDA’s breadth suspiciously.
B. Public Interests Against Enforcement of a CBI NDA
On the other side of the balancing test, courts must weigh factors that
indicate the strength of the public’s interest against enforcement of a CBI
NDA. These factors include the extent to which the CBI NDA resembles a
noncompete agreement, the CBI NDA’s compliance with the rules of
reasonableness applied to noncompetes in the jurisdiction, and the CBI
NDA’s predictable adverse impact on other public interests.
1. The Extent to Which the CBI NDA Resembles a Noncompete
CBI NDAs can inhibit an employee’s ability to gain another job in the
same profession or otherwise to compete with her employer.301 As discussed
at length above, the distinction between noncompetes and CBI NDAs can be
thin, or even illusory, in many cases. CBI NDAs can be and often are used
to punish employees for leaving their employers and seeking alternative
employment.302 Such CBI NDAs likely harm employee mobility and stifle
economic competition. The more anticompetitive a CBI NDA is, the greater
the public interest against enforcing the agreement.303
The most clearly anticompetitive CBI NDAs are those that prevent an
employee from using her general skills and knowledge for other employers.
Such agreements are “more properly characterized” as noncompetes than as
true NDAs.304 But even CBI NDAs more properly limited to information that
is actually confidential or proprietary may still limit employee mobility. The
mere existence of a CBI NDA “may deter a prospective employer from
hiring a prospective employee,” particularly when “the employee would
inevitably reveal the former employer’s confidential information” and when
“the former employer has a reputation for strictly enforcing its contracts
through litigation.”305 When evaluating the enforceability of a CBI NDA,
courts should ask whether a former employee has taken a job that would
inevitably require her to use confidential information learned at her former
job. If the answer is yes, the CBI NDA is potentially injurious to economic
competition and employee mobility, and it should be subject to heightened

301

See supra Section III.B; infra note 305 and accompanying text.
See supra Part III for examples of CBI NDA actions involving employees who left their
employers to seek employment elsewhere.
303 See supra note 18 and accompanying text (noting that noncompetes are judicially disfavored as
contracts in restraint of trade).
304 Orthofix, Inc. v. Hunter, 630 F. App’x 566, 573 (6th Cir. 2015).
305 Bast, supra note 14, at 642–43.
302
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scrutiny.306 This is true even if the jurisdiction that provides the substantive
law of the NDA rejects the inevitable disclosure doctrine, and thus the NDA
could not be enforced on the basis of such “inevitable disclosure.” The threat
to competition and employee mobility in such cases comes not only from the
actual potential for enforcement but also from the employee’s subjective fear
of legal liability: logically, an employee who has signed a broadly worded
NDA (one that includes information the employee would “inevitably” use in
subsequent employment) would have cause for concern that the NDA would
be used against her if she took the same job for a different employer. 307
Furthermore, CBI NDAs drafted by businesses that persistently enforce the
contracts through litigation may be more problematic from a public policy
perspective because they may dissuade employees of those businesses from
seeking employment elsewhere and competing employers from hiring those
employees. If employees have reason to fear litigation arising from the mere
act of changing jobs, they may feel compelled to remain in their current
positions. 308 This potential “intimidation factor” may increase in cases in
which the CBI NDA at issue contains broad, nonspecific definitions of CBI.
It would be more difficult for employees subject to such CBI NDAs to ensure
they will not face liability if they attempt to change jobs.
There is cause for concern that Tesla’s CBI NDA is substantially
anticompetitive.309 To begin, Tesla’s CBI NDA aggressively defines CBI as
“all information . . . to which [employees] have access by virtue of” their
employment at Tesla.310 This potentially includes Tesla employees’ general
skills and knowledge. Again, although the CBI NDA purports to exclude
306 One might contend that the opposite of this position is true: namely, that employers have a
heightened interest in enforcing NDAs when they know employees will inevitably use confidential
information at a subsequent job. However, one should consider whether the “confidential” information is
actually confidential if its use in future employment would be “inevitable.” Employers should not be able
to use the doctrine of inevitable disclosure to force contracts that are in substance noncompetes on
employees, under the guise of NDAs. See the discussion of PepsiCo, supra notes 191–193 and
accompanying text. In other words, the fact that employees will inevitably use “confidential” information
at their next jobs could be a sign that the confidential information is in fact part of the employee’s general
skills and knowledge. Moreover, one cannot forget the other side of the equation: while employers
certainly have an interest in protecting confidential information, employees also have a compelling
interest in their own mobility and ensuring that they can transfer skills that they have learned to other
jobs. It is an open question that would likely have to be determined on a case-by-case basis whether an
employer’s interest in preserving particular CBI could equitably justify restricting an employee from
pursuing the career of her choice.
307 For a similar argument, see supra notes 176–181 and accompanying text (discussing Harvey
Barnett, Inc. v. Shidler, 338 F.3d 1125 (10th Cir. 2003)).
308 Demurrer, supra note 8, at 8 (arguing Tesla sued Rivian to “scare employees thinking about
leaving Tesla”).
309 Rivian itself has raised the specter of the anticompetitive potential of Tesla’s NDA litigation. See
supra Introduction.
310 Complaint, supra note 2, Ex. A, at 1.
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publicly available information, the contract puts the onus on employees to
prove that this exclusion applies by clear and convincing evidence. 311
Therefore, if read literally, there is not much distinguishing Tesla’s CBI
NDA from a noncompete agreement, as an employee cannot shed her past
experiences when changing jobs. For the same reason, the CBI NDA raises
concerns that employees subject to it would inevitably breach the CBI NDA
if they attempted to change jobs. Consider, for instance, the plight of Kim
Wong, a former Tesla recruiter.312 Tesla alleges that Ms. Wong took with her
documents about Tesla’s recruiting processes after she was hired by
Rivian. 313 But Ms. Wong may have inevitably used such information for
Rivian if the documents informed her general skills or strategies as a
recruiter. 314 Furthermore, Tesla actively and aggressively participates in
confidentiality litigation, raising concerns that its attempted enforcement of
the CBI NDA could be anticompetitive.315 Tesla’s suit against Rivian, a small
311

See supra note 297 and accompanying text.
Complaint, supra note 2, Ex. A, at 6–7.
313 Id. at 7.
314 True, Tesla itself probably would not be able to make a strong inevitable disclosure argument,
since California courts, at least for now, have rejected the inevitable disclosure doctrine. Whyte v. Schlage
Lock Co., 125 Cal. Rptr. 2d 277, 293 (Ct. App. 2002). But this could always change, and the California
supreme court does not appear to have spoken directly on the issue. Moreover, Tesla has employees across
the nation and globe; it is not clear how many of those employees are made to sign NDAs or what
substantive law governs those NDAs. See Tim Levin, Tesla Grew Its Workforce by Nearly 50% During
Its Monumental 2020, INSIDER (Feb. 9, 2021, 2:36 PM), https://www.businessinsider.com/teslaexpansion-grew-workforce-47-percent-last-year-2021-2 [https://perma.cc/886P-TJ7Y]. Moreover, even
if Tesla would not be able to make an inevitable disclosure argument in California state court, it is
important to consider the chilling effect of the NDA from an employee’s perspective. An employee faced
with an NDA as broadly worded as Tesla’s may fear that changing jobs would incur liability under the
NDA. See supra Section III.B.2 (discussing Harvey Barnett, Inc. v. Shidler).
315 See, e.g., Jeremy Korzeniewski, Tesla Files Suit Against Fisker Automotive, AUTOBLOG (Apr.
15, 2008, 10:28 AM), https://www.autoblog.com/2008/04/15/tesla-files-suit-against-fisker-automotive/
?guccounter=1&guce_referrer=aHR0cHM6Ly93d3cuZ29vZ2xlLmNvbS8&guce_referrer_sig=AQAA
AJSvixJ0VsATBMhaE3H-Z9nVLfW3CJtmfXg9t10oosWI7Eryk0TPpFSXquH5zaviVZSWyjGvYlDSd
i3lAoo0klg9knFa2FHBvebpcALQk-PlxBGWJK4srnYJSAWQd8JCU9TVtqr_iDaoOTZ6x43qNYk-rV
6_Nl5_Pd3mN6hYFp9R [https://perma.cc/K4SN-4U4E] (reporting the Tesla lawsuit alleging former
employees “stole design ideas and confidential information related to the design of hybrid and electric
cars” and seeking to prevent the use of “any design ideas garnered from [their] relationship with Tesla”);
Greg Sandoval, Tesla Suit Alleges New Hire Made Off With Valuable Trade Secrets, LAW.COM: THE
RECORDER (Jan. 22, 2021, 5:06 PM), https://www.law.com/therecorder/2021/01/22/tesla-suit-allegesnew-hire-made-off-with-valuable-trade-secrets/ [https://perma.cc/MV3H-VJBJ] (reporting lawsuit
“accus[ing] a former employee of pilfering trade secrets related to the technology that powers many of
[Tesla’s] automated processes”); Jonathan Stempel, Judge Narrows Tesla Lawsuit Against Former
Employee, Dismisses Defamation Counterclaim, REUTERS (Sept. 18, 2020, 1:31 AM), https://www.
reuters.com/article/us-tesla-court-tripp-idUKKBN2690TD [https://perma.cc/6H8A-J4YM] (reporting
suit alleging hacking and the leaking of confidential information); Kirsten Korosec, Tesla Sues Former
Employees, Zoox for Alleged Trade Secret Theft, TECHCRUNCH (Mar. 21, 2019, 1:05 PM), https://
techcrunch.com/2019/03/21/tesla-sues-former-employees-zoox-for-alleged-trade-secret-theft/ [https://
perma.cc/T5DY-SK4X] (reporting suits alleging stealing of trade secrets).
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automotive business, may cause other competitors to think twice before
hiring Tesla employees in the future. In sum of these considerations—the
Tesla CBI NDA’s breadth, its susceptibility to “inevitable disclosure,” and
Tesla’s role as a confidentiality litigant—a court would have ample reason
to believe that the CBI NDA harms economic competition and employee
mobility.
2.

The Extent to Which the CBI NDA Complies with Limitations on
Noncompetes
Next, courts should consider the extent to which the CBI NDA complies
with limitations the relevant jurisdiction places on noncompetes, such as
temporal or geographic limitations.316 This consideration interacts with the
questions discussed in the previous Section. If a CBI NDA is unlike a
noncompete in purpose or effect, then the fact that the CBI NDA does not
comply with legal limitations placed on noncompete agreements in the
jurisdiction may not be of great concern. By contrast, if a CBI NDA prevents
an employee from using her general skills and knowledge—or if other major
warning signs of anticompetitiveness exist—and the CBI NDA is completely
unlimited by the jurisdiction’s typical restrictions on noncompetes, a court
should not enforce the CBI NDA except in extraordinary circumstances. In
other words, courts should apply a combination of the Conditional Rule and
Factor Rule, as discussed above. Under the Conditional Rule, if an NDA
purports to prohibit an employee from using her general skills and
knowledge, or is otherwise significantly anticompetitive, courts should
rather strictly apply the reasonableness criteria of noncompetes to the NDA.
Under the Factor Rule, however, even more properly limited NDAs might
not be reasonable if they are completely free of the typical restrictions the
relevant jurisdiction places on noncompetes.317
Some may argue that this analysis would unduly burden freedom of
contract if it were used to prevent enforcement of agreements that were not
drafted or intended as noncompetes and indeed may have been drafted to
avoid the application of state noncompete laws. But this Section attempts to
establish the distinction between CBI NDAs and noncompetes as one of
substance, rather than mere form. If a CBI NDA is genuinely not
anticompetitive in purpose and effect, then there is little reason to strictly
apply the law of noncompetes to determine its validity. But employers should
not be able to benefit from the law’s relaxed treatment of CBI NDAs (relative
to noncompetes) by dressing up a plainly anticompetitive contract as an
information-protection provision.
316
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See supra note 153 and accompanying text.
See supra Section III.B.3.
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Return to Tesla for an example. The sheer breadth of Tesla’s CBI NDA,
combined with other factors indicating the potential for anticompetitive
results, cause the CBI NDA to strongly resemble a noncompete. California
generally prohibits the enforcement of employee noncompetes.318 Thus, there
is nothing Tesla can do to mitigate the CBI NDA’s anticompetitive effects
to a degree that is satisfactory by the standards of California public policy.
In short, California’s public policy against the enforcement of noncompete
agreements evidences a strong policy in favor of competition and employee
mobility319 and weighs heavily against the enforcement of Tesla’s CBI NDA.
3. The NDA’s Predictable Adverse Impact on Other Public Interests
CBI NDAs may be contrary to public policy for reasons other than those
discussed above. Courts ought to evaluate enforceability on a case-by-case
basis, using the open-ended nature of the public policy defense to identify
potential concerns throwing the enforceability of a CBI NDA into doubt.
Some of these concerns have arisen in actions to enforce NDAs beyond the
context of business information. 320 In short, because public policy is not
entirely dependent on legal reasoning, courts should be willing to consider a
broad variety of arguments against enforceability, even if those arguments
are not strictly “legal” in nature.321 Courts should not interpret public policy
narrowly: even legal principles that do not directly control the case at hand
can be sources of public policy. However, general appeals to public policy
may be less persuasive than sources of public policy encoded in statutes or
regulations.
Of course, one may argue that public policy should not be interpreted
so expansively and that this approach could be used by judges to hunt for
reasons to find for sympathetic employee-defendants in CBI NDA cases.
Some may even argue that, to prevent such a cherry-picking approach to
public policy, the defense should generally be limited to policies that are
firmly entrenched in statutes, regulations, and common law precedents. But
there is good reason to think the public policy defense should not be so
limited. As discussed above, public policy by its very nature seeks to
preserve human and social values as a part of contract law.322 And while
potential threats to judicial impartiality are always of concern, this risk would
be mitigated if judges simply considered both sides of the argument: if a
judge identifies public policies against the enforcement of a particular CBI
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NDA, she should attempt to see if those policies are counterbalanced by
public interests favoring enforcement.
CONCLUSION
Much commentary on NDAs, especially of late, has been devoted to
debates on whether, and to what extent, NDAs should be enforceable when
they prevent individuals from speaking out on sexual assault or against
political leaders, 323 or even from blowing the whistle on corporate
misconduct. 324 As this Note has demonstrated, these discussions share a
common thread: a belief that the nondisclosure mandated by NDAs could
harm public interests, even as they confer private benefits. This Note has
examined this common thread in the context of CBI NDAs. Though less
studied, this Note has shown that CBI NDAs can present public hazards, as
do NDAs in other contexts.
Courts face a significant problem when attempting to enforce business
NDAs that protect information other than trade secrets. As this Note has
demonstrated, courts assessing the enforceability of these NDAs must
balance a business’s interest in protecting valuable CBI with the potential
anticompetitive impacts of broad NDAs. The public policy defense to
contract enforcement provides a useful framework for courts to use in
balancing these interests.
This Note has provided an overview of extant case law surrounding the
enforceability of CBI NDAs, and it has proposed a structure, based on the
public policy defense, for courts to use in analyzing these claims. In brief,
on the private interest side, courts faced with an NDA protecting CBI should
first consider if the CBI NDA was formed and negotiated fairly between
equally competent parties—which, as discussed, will not be the case for
many CBI NDAs between employees and their employers. Courts should
also consider whether enforcing the CBI NDA would further or frustrate the
policies of trade secret law. On the public interest side, courts should
consider whether a CBI NDA is intended to be, or is actually, anticompetitive
and whether any anticompetitive impact is mitigated by the CBI NDA’s
compliance with the jurisdiction’s limitations on noncompete agreements.
Courts need not stop there; because public policy is an open-ended defense,
courts may identify other legal, political, or moral principles bearing on the
CBI NDA’s enforceability. This test would allow courts to protect CBI in
which businesses have a legitimate interest while at the same time
safeguarding employees’ mobility and an open, competitive marketplace.
323
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See supra notes 26–28 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 203–208 and accompanying text.
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